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The playground at the St. James Episcopal Church' is a nice, short walk
from my home in Knoxville, Tennessee. The church generously allows
neighborhood kids to use it, and with two young daughters (ages two and
four), I spend quite a bit of time on playgrounds these days. The St. James
playground is a great example of what I call the "new" playground

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. B.A. 1991,
Haverford College; J.D. 1996, University of Michigan. The author gives special thanks to Indya
Kincannon, Tom Galligan, Joe King, Brannon Denning, George Schatzld, Chris Sagers, the
participants of faculty forums at the University of Tennessee College of Law, and the AALS
Conference, Chicago, May 2005, the University of Tennessee College of Law for generous research
support, and the Honorable Diana Gribbon Motz.
1. Saint James Episcopal Church, http://www.stjamesknox.org/ministries/html (last visited
June 1, 2005). For pictures of the playground, see Appendix A.
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paradigm: It is built on a floor of wood chips and is modular, colorful, and
made largely from plastic and rubber-coated steel. It is not an exceptional
playground, but it is close to our house, and we end up there quite a bit.
We love this little playground. It has a ground level "house" with two
windows, a little bench, and a round mirror. The girls love to play house
there, as well as dump the wood chips in and out of the windows. There is
a round tube with circular holes that we call the "tickle tunnel." The tickle
tunnel entry is a brazen invitation to Dad to stick his arms through the
holes and tickle any willing victim silly.2 There is a little stairway for my
two-year-old and several different climbing options for my four-year-old.
There are swinging chin-up hoops for the four-year-old to swing out and
back on, and there is a raised fort with a steering wheel for pirate ship or
bus driving adventures.' And, of course, there are three slides (one shorter
for toddlers) and four swings (two baby/bucket swings and two regular
swings) .'
One of the unforeseen benefits of parenting is the light it sheds on your
own childhood, parents, and upbringing. Playgrounds are no exception.
Many times on the St. James playground I have thought about the sorry
playgrounds I grew up with in the 1970s in Brooklyn, New York.' I
generally played on what I will call the "traditional" playground: steel
swings, freestanding steel slides, jungle gyms, and seesaws on a concrete
surface surrounded by a chain link fence. 6 Even as a kid, these
playgrounds struck me as stark, depressing, and unidimensional.

2. This also doubles as the "smooches" tunnel, where the girls poke their lips through the
holes in the tunnel, and I come to dole out smooches. In a humorous echo of my adolescent
romantic life, tickles are always more popular than smooches.
3. As tempted as I was to pack this entire Article with photos of my family and the St. James
playground, I thought it might be considered obnoxious. So, I dumped a bunch of photos (including
swinging and driving photos) on a separate webpage. See Playground Photos,
http://www.law.utk.edu/faculty/playgroundpics.htm (last visited June 1, 2005) [hereinafter
Playground Photos].
4. For a picture of a typical bucket swing, see Institutional Enclosed & Bucket Swing Seats,
http://www.shapeupshop.corn/games/playground/bucket-seats.html (last visited June 1, 2005) or
Playground Photos, supra note 3.
5. I grew up in the Park Slope section of Brooklyn before it became a chi-chi yuppie
neighborhood. For a roughly contemporaneous semi-fictional description of growing up in Boerum
Hill (a neighboring, though less gentrified, Brooklyn neighborhood), see JONATHAN LETHEM, THE
FORTRESS OF SOLITUDE (2003). For a more current description of life in Park Slope, see Louise G.
Crawford, Postcards from the Slope, Only the Blog Knows Brooklyn,
http://onlytheblogknowsbrooklyn.typepad.comonly the-blog-knows-brook/postcard-from.the
_slope/index.html (last visited June 1, 2005).
6. For a great example, less the fence and concrete, see Appendix B. Oblong Park
Playground Fund, http://www.villageofoblong.com/playground/ (last visited June 1,2005) (raising
money to replace the playground' s old equipment). For an example of seesaws situated on concrete,
see Playground Photos, supra note 3.
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I went to elementary school at P.S. 3217 on Seventh Avenue, and I still
remember vividly the day they placed rubber mats on top of the hard, hard
concrete under our metal jungle gym. I remember because I had fallen and
scraped myself many times on the concrete, and the rubber mats were a
revelation: "You mean we could have had rubber mats all this time? What
gives?"'
The movement that led to my rubber mats has spread all over the
country. The traditional American playground has been replaced one
playground at a time by a shiny new playground paradigm. 9 Modular
playgrounds on soft surfaces, designed and constructed according to
voluntary safety standards,1" have sprouted up country-wide," replacing
the concrete and metal playgrounds of our youth.

7. For a current look at P.S. 321, see P.S. 321 Homepage, http://ps32 1.org/ (last visited June
1, 2005).
8. Nevertheless, later that school year as I hung upside down from my knees on the monkey
bars and stared down at the rubber mats (no doubt contemplating the fragility of both our existence
and my own skull), I could not help but wonder about the relative thinness of the rubber covering
vis-A-vis the potential velocity of my head in a face-first fall.
9. Many have noted this trend, from newspapers, see Carol Lawson, PlaygroundsShaped
by Today's Urban Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1989, at C I ("Many children around the country
will never know the Spartan battleship-gray swings and monkey bars, planted in concrete, that
shaped the childhoods of their parents. For them, the playground is a fanciful
environment... mazes of tunnels, bridges, ladders, and platforms .. "),
to playground designers
and park managers, see PLAY FOR ALL GUIDELINES 64-128 (Robin C. Moore et al. eds., 2d ed.
1992) (describing the new playground equipment and surfaces); LEONARD E. PHILLIps, PARKS:
DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT 17-32 (1996) (containing chapters on current playground design and
playground safety), to tort reform advocates, see Philip K. Howard, Is Civil Litigationa Threat to
Freedom?, 28 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 97, 101 (2004) ("Ordinary elements of life, such as
playgrounds, have been completely transformed.").
10. There are two main bodies of American playground safety standards. The most
comprehensive guide is the Consumer Product Safety Commission's Handbook for Public Safety.
It offers safety guidelines (not mandatory regulations) for public playgrounds. See U.S. CONSUMER
PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION, HANDBOOK FOR PUBLC PLAYGROUND SAFETY (1997) [hereinafter
CPSC, HANDBOOK]. The American Society for Testing Materials (ASTM) offers a set of guidelines
for playground surfaces. See ASTM INTERNATIONAL, STANDARD GUIDE FOR ASTM STANDARDS
ON PLAYGROUND SURFACING (2005). Although these standards are non-binding, they have become
the state of the art for playground design, see PHILLPS, supra note 9, at 27, and have been used as
a baseline in playground litigation. See Hinkley v. Krantz, 658 N.E.2d 797, 799 (Ohio Ct. App.
1995).
11. For some great examples of these new style playgrounds, see Playground Photos, supra
note 3. Also available on the internet are playground photos from manufacturers or playground
designers. See, e.g., BCI Burke, Premiere Play Environments, http://www.bciburke.com/product
s.iml (last visited June 1, 2005), Leathers & Associates, Custom-Designed Community Built
Projects, http://www.leathersassociates.comlphoto_frame.htm (last visited June 1, 2005).
Apparently, there are now some spectacular new playgrounds in Prospect Park near where I grew
up. See Prospect Park, Park Destinations: Playgrounds, http://www.prospectpark.org/dest/main.cfm
?target=play
(lastLaw
visited
June 1, 2005).
Published
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Chewing over this phenomenon on the St. James playground led me to
two questions: What happened to the traditional playground, and if it is
true that today's playgrounds are superior, 2 what does that tell us about
the arguments for and against tort reform? As a torts professor, I had an
easy answer for the first question: Liability and safety concerns killed the
traditional playground. This killing actually was a pretty impressive
accomplishment: The traditional playground had been criticized for
years, yet had basically survived unchanged from the turn of the
century.14

12. I later discuss this issue more fully, infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text, but know
for now that the new playgrounds are not universally admired. Playground designers and landscape
architects have criticized the sameness of current manufactured playgrounds. See BARBARA E.
HENDRICKS, DESIGNING FOR PLAY 163-67 (2001) (decrying "[tihe sameness of public park
playgrounds" and arguing that "[e]ach play area should be unique"); Janny Scott, When Child's
Play is Too Simple, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2000, at B9 (stating that "some landscape architects and
scholars" see "deadening sameness" in current playgrounds).
A less surprising group of criticisms have come from commentators decrying the
"wimpification" of America, or our new "nanny-state." These wimpification diatribes are multiple
(try a Google search for "wimpification of America"), but for a paradigmatic example, see Ronnie
Polaneczky, Will 'Unique' ParkLose Out to 'Standard?,' PHMADELPHIA DAILY NEWS, July 18,
2003, at 5 (describing "[a]nother nail in the wimpification of Philly's children" because of the
closure of Smith playground to meet insurance companies' standards). For a more measured,
nanny-state type argument, consider Joseph H. King, Jr., Exculpatory Agreementsfor Volunteers
in Youth Activities-the Alternativeto "Nerf@" Tiddlywinks, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 683,684-86 (1992)
(arguing that allowing tort liability for adult volunteers at children's activities despite exculpatory
agreements might result in the elimination of many children's activities).
This criticism always makes me smirk. I suppose that the scrapes and bruises I received on
those "prison yard"-like playgrounds, see Johnson, infra note 14, at 1,toughened me somehow, but
the value of the whole experience is now lost on me. Maybe I need to run full speed and spill face
first onto concrete to remember how good I had it. More fundamentally, I think the nanny-state
critics and I are like ships in the night. To my mind the new playground structures are
unquestionably superior to what they replaced. The new playgrounds are not only safer (do the tort
reform critics really prefer concrete to wood chips or pebbles?), but are better in every objective
sense. The new playgrounds are nicer looking, more fun to play on, require less parental and
governmental supervision and maintenance, and encourage kids to play imaginatively and together.
I offer a longer diatribe on the superiority of the new playgrounds, infra Part III.
13. See, e.g., ARLENE BRETT ET AL, THE COMPLETE PLAYGROUND BOOK 9-11 (1993)
("American playgrounds have traditionally consisted of a concrete or asphalt surface with steel
jungle gyms, merry-go-rounds, slides, and swings. . . . Unfortunately, [these] traditional
playgrounds still dominate American schools, public parks, community centers, and recreation
sites."); ALBERT J. RUTLEDGE, ANATOMY OF A PARK 21 (197 1) ("An example of standardization
run amuck is the 'typical' playground. Always the same swings, the same teeter-totters, the same
slides. Sameness dulls visual appetites ...").
14. A review of playground design literature shows that the big five of traditional
playgrounds-swings, slides, seesaws, jungle gyms, and carousels-were part of the very first
playgrounds around the turn of the century and remained fixtures until the late twentieth century.
For example, the authors of a seminal 1909 book on playground design found "[t]he following
apparatus ... [to be] the most valuable to the playground: Swings, see-saws ... an open air 4
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/1
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The answer to the second question was harder. If the new playgrounds
are better than the old playgrounds, a sacred cow of the tort reform battles
is implicated. For years, tort reform advocates have argued that the laws
of product liability and torts 5 retard innovation. The "product liability
discourages innovation" trope has gained great currency, and been
accepted by courts, 6 by Congress, 7 and by multiple commentators.18 This
gymnasium [described similarly to a jungle gym] ...[a] merry-go-round [and a] slide for life."
1 ARTHUR LELAND & LORNA HIGBEE LELAND, PLAYGROUND TECHNIQUE AND PLAYCRAFT 196-97
(1910). A 1947 book on "recreation areas" similarly lists the swing, the slide, the climbing
structure, and the see-saw among "common types of apparatus." See GEORGE D. BUTLER,
RECREATION AREAS: THEM DESIGN AND EQUIPMENT 20-24 (2d ed. 1958). A children's book by
Richard Scarry from the 1960s shows the same basic playground equipment. See RICHARD SCARRY,
RICHARD SCARRY'S BEST WORD BOOK EVER 12-13 (1963) (showing a swing, a slide, a seesaw, a
merry-go-round, and a jungle gym on a page of common words titled "at the playground").
Concrete had been a favored and featured ground cover for a similarly lengthy time period. See
AASE

ERIKSEN,

PLAYGROUND

DESIGN:

OUTDOOR

ENVIRONMENTS

FOR LEARNING

AND

DEVELOPMENT 16 (1985) (noting that "asphalt... eventually became standard" as the playground

surface); Lauri MacMillan Johnson, American Playgroundsand Schoolyards-A Timefor Change,
Open Space Research Center Conference, at 1, available at http://www.openspace.eca.ac.uk/
conference/proceedings/PDF/Macmillan.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2005) ("Comprising a collection
of isolated metal structures set upon a flat paved surface, however, play yards from this period
evoke images of prison yards.").
15. I use both of these terms here because it is not always clear the area of the law that tort
reform advocates claim as innovation killer. It seems most likely that they object to what has come
to be known as the "design defect" aspect of product liability. Under a "design defect" theory, a
plaintiff injured by a product that has been defectively designed can win a lawsuit by establishing
the existence of a reasonable alternative design and without proving a negligent design. For a much
fuller description of the law in this area, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS § 16.11 (1999); DAVID
G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 480-560 (2005). I also explore this theory further in Part I.
16. See, e.g., White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998, 1018 (9th Cit. 2002) (discussing
federalism concerns and punitive damages, and arguing that a Nevada award "may deter not only
conduct tortious in other states, but also innovations and economies of production that other states
have purposely tailored their laws not to discourage so strongly"); Soproni v. Polygon Apartment
Partners, 971 P.2d 500, 509 n.2 (Wash. 1999) (Talmadge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing Philip A. Talmadge, ProductLiabilityAct of 1981: Ten Years Later,27 GONZ. L. REV.
153, 159 (1991-1992)).
17. See S. REP. No. 105-32, at 1 (1997) ("The [product liability] system's unpredictability
and inefficiency have stifled innovation, kept beneficial products off the market, and have
handicapped American firms as they compete in the global economy.").
18. See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
155-61 (1988); Deborah J. La Fetra, Freedom,Responsibility, and Risk: FundamentalPrinciples
Supporting Tort Reform, 36 IND. L. REV. 645, 646-54 (2003) (arguing that "the prospect of tort
liability inhibits innovation"). The assertion has become so ingrained among tort-reform advocates
that it is regularly listed by rote with the other alleged harms imposed by the tort system. See Victor
E. Schwartz et al., FosteringMutual Respect and CooperationBetween State Courts and State
Legislatures:A Sound Alternative to a Tort Tug of War, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 2 & n. 1 (2000)
[herinafter Schwartz, Fostering Mutual Respect] (citing WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION
EXPLOSION 223, 247 (1992) (claiming that "unchecked and unbalanced tort law can limit the
availability of necessary medical services, discourage innovation, lead to the removal of useful and
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argument has intuitive appeal. It seems right that fearful, chastened
corporations would react to expanding tort liability by hesitating to create
bold new products or to do anything that might expose them to further tort
liability.
Despite this intuitive appeal, current playgrounds prove the exact
opposite. The new playground design proves that the challenge of
replacing and redesigning a failed and dangerous product actually may
inspire manufacturers to create not only safer products, but better
products. 9 Innovative manufacturers take the opportunity to redesign and
to rethink unsafe products from the ground up with greatly improved
results. This Article argues that the tort reformers have gotten at least one
of their justifications for reform wrong: The law of product liability does
not retard innovation.2 ° To the contrary, in some markets it actually has led
to a spectacular rise in innovation.
The Article is divided into three parts. 2 ' Part I describes the product

safe products and devices from the marketplace, and increase costs to consumers")); Victor E.
Schwartz & Leah Lorber, The General Aviation Revitalization Act: How Rational Civil Justice
Reform Revitalized an Industry, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 1269, 1323 (2002) ("Excessive litigation
affects interstate commerce through high damages awards, lack of uniformity and unpredictability
under state law, which add to the price of products, discourage innovation, and hamper the
competitiveness of American businesses.").
19. There is an additional benefit to choosing playground design as my case study for the
innovation/tort reform correlation: Playground design has become another new front in the ongoing
battles over tort reform. A leading proponent of tort reform, Philip K. Howard, begins his seminal
attack on the current tort system in The Collapseofthe Common Good with an anecdote describing
the removal of a double slide in Oologah, Oklahoma because of a lawsuit against the town. See
PI-u' K. HOWARD,THE COUAPSE OF THE COMMON GOOD 3-4 (2001). For more on Howard and
playgrounds, see infra notes 148-63 and accompanying text. Other examples of a playground/tort
reform connection include a recent Newsweek article, see Stuart Taylor Jr. et al., Civil Wars,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 15, 2003, at 42 ("Playgrounds all over the country have been stripped of monkey
bars, jungle gyms, high slides and swings, seesaws and other old-fashioned equipment once
popularized by President John F. Kennedy's physical-fitness campaign. The reason: thousands of
lawsuits by people who hurt themselves at playgrounds."), and an op-ed piece by George Will, see
George F. Will, Why Think When You Can Sue?, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, June 2, 2002, at H3
(arguing that "seesaws and swings are endangered species of playground equipment" because of
"fear of liability"). Congress featured the playground revolution in support of one of its recent
legislative tort reform efforts. See H.R. REP. No. 108-682, at 9-10 (2004) (referencing the above
works by Philip Howard and Stuart Taylor in support of the contention that "[tihe lawsuit culture
is even changing the traditional American landscape: playgrounds are increasingly removing
seesaws for fear of liability").
20. As noted infra note 166 and accompanying text, I am not making a broader claim about
the merits of tort reform, or even a claim that all of the justifications for tort reform are bogus. Iam
convinced however, that the innovation claim is bunk.
21. Law review readers will recognize the archetypes for these three parts immediately: Part
I poses the problem-does product liability law retard innovation?; Part I proposes an answer or
a solution-no, and sometimes it encourages it; Part I provides an example and supporting
evidence-playground design.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/1
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liability/innovation debate more extensively and details the arguments and
empirical evidence for and against a negative correlation. Part I1 argues
three main points: (1) Be careful predicting future economic effects when
costs are easy to foresee and benefits are murkier; (2) outmoded
technology and business approaches frequently remain on the market out
of sheer inertia; and (3) entrepreneurial companies may not simply patch
failed products, they fully rethink and redesign them. I also indulge in a
brief discussion of the economist Joseph Schumpeter's entrepreneurial
mindset and a Calabresian argument that manufacturers are probably in the
best position to innovate and "make lemonade" out of the lemons of
design defects. Part LH then applies these theories to playground design
and argues that product liability law and heightened safety concerns
actually have resulted in a quality revolution in public playgrounds.
I. PREVIOUS

THINKING ON THE EFFECT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY

LAW ON INNOVATION

A humorous side note to the innovation/product liability debate is the
tort reformers' implication that this debate is somehow new and
unprecedented. To the contrary, the common law courts' struggle at the
intersection of law and innovation is the master narrative of nineteenth and
twentieth century torts and product liability law.22 Courts have had to
decide how to apply the common law of torts-which was largely created
in a pre-industrial era-to the innumerable innovations in manufacturing
and retail in the last 160 years. The common law of torts and contracts was
designed for a simpler time when almost every tort or contract case
involved parties who knew each other and products that were individually
manufactured.23
At first, common law courts reacted to the nineteenth century roil of
innovation and mechanization with a series of doctrines protecting the new
technologies and industries from liability. Lawrence Friedman's A History
ofAmerican Law argues that nineteenth century tort law is best understood
by reading a series of cases involving "the prince of machines," the

22. See Alvin S. Weinstein et al., ProductLiability:An Interactionof Law and Technology,
12 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (1974). For an example covering the railroad, a great nineteenth century
innovation, see generally JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW (2001).
23. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OFAMERICAN LAW 300 (2d ed. 1985) (arguing
that "[e]xisting tort law was simply not designed to deal with" an industrialized society); John C.
P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEo. L.J. 513, 516-21 (2003) (describing the
"traditional" account of tort law's infancy); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Dedication, The Path of the
Law, 10 HAR. L. REv. 465,467 (1897) (noting that turn-of-the-century torts involved injuries from
railroads and factories, while the existing law of torts came from the "old days of isolated,
ungeneralized wrongs, assaults, slanders, and the like").
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railroad.2 4 Courts devised defenses and new doctrinal bases for forgiving
liability to the new industries, consciously and unconsciously seeking to
shield "the key to economic development" from crushing liability."
Similarly, early product liability suits were stymied by the requirement of
contractual privity26 between sellers and buyers and the ancient doctrine
of caveat emptor.27
Courts at the turn of the twentieth century began to create multiple
exceptions to these protective doctrines, 28 and by the early twentieth
century many protective doctrines had been abandoned.29 A great product
liability example is the elimination of the common law requirement of
privity between the parties to a lawsuit.3" Similar to arguments made
during the current debate over tort reform, commentators criticized the
elimination of the privity requirement as a potential industry killer.31

24. FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at 300-02, 468-76.
25. Id. at 468. The defenses included contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the
fellow-servant rule. Doctrinal expansions included a great tightening of the rules of proximate
cause. See id. at 468-76; Shawn Everett Kantor & Price V. Fishback, Nonfatal Accident
Compensationand the Common Law at the Turn of the Century, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 406,408-11
(1995) (examining "three central issues relating to postaccident compensation under negligence
liability," including the extent to which tort defense doctrines influenced accident compensation
at the turn of the century).
26. Courts had required "privity" (i.e., a contractual relationship) between sellers and buyers
as a precursor to a warranty claim. Since a main feature of the industrial revolution was the rise of
a separation between manufacturing and retail, this requirement proved a difficult hurdle to injured
plaintiffs seeking to sue manufacturers. See Richard A. Epstein, The Case Against Black
Reparations,84 B.U. L. REV. 1177, 1184 (2004) (describing the history ofthe privity requirement);
Timothy S. Hall, Reimagining the Learned Intermediary Rule for the New Pharmaceutical
Marketplace, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 193, 241 n.235 (2004) (same).
27. See OWEN, supra note 15, § 1.2, at 17-23; David Owen, ProductsLiabilityLaw Restated,
49 S.C. L. REV. 273, 275-77 (1998). For an excellent history and consideration of "the judicial
understandings that motivated the rise in modem tort law," see Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning
and the Possible End of the Rise of ModernAmerican Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601,602 (1992).
28. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at 476-87.

29. OWEN, supra note 15, § 1.3, at 23-24.
30. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) (Cardozo, J.)
("We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of
negligence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else. We have put the source of the
obligation where it ought to be. We have put its source in the law."); see also William L. Prosser,
The Assault Upon the Citadel(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1148 (1960)
(concluding that the "assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace"). For a
terrific historical discussion of MacPherson, see Sally H. Clarke, Unmanageable Risks:
MacPherson v. Buick and the Emergence of a Mass Consumer Market, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 1
(2005).
31. See Walter H. E. Jaeger, Warranties of Merchantabilityand Fitness for Use: Recent
Developments, 16 RuTGERS L. REV. 493, 557 (1962); Note, Strict Products Liability and the
Bystander, 64 COLUm. L. REV. 916, 923 (1964) (citing privity as a protection for industrial
development).
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The next great expansion of product liability law came in the 1960s
with the adoption of a "strict liability" standard for manufactured
products.32 Theoretically, the new product liability law replaced a
negligence standard with strict liability, but there has been ongoing
disagreement about how "strict" product liability is, and whether the law
has actually changed much from the negligence standard.33
Regardless of how the law is couched, however, there is little doubt
that from the mid-1960s until the 1980s there was a large-scale expansion
in manufacturer liability to plaintiffs injured by manufactured products.-4
Exactly how many suits there were, and how much was spent on damages,
legal and court fees are still hotly debated questions,35 but most agree that
32. Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court penned two of the seminal opinions in
the development of this law, starting with his concurrence in Escola v. Coca ColaBottling Co., 150
P.2d 436, 461 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring), and continuing on to the majority opinion in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963), which held that "[a]
manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to
be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being."
For a full history of the development of product liability law and a description of its current status,
see OWEN, supra note 15, at 3-48. For other more succinct versions of this history, see RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 3-7 (1980); Gary T. Schwartz, ProductLiability
and Medical Malpracticein Comparative Context, in THE LIABIIT'Y MAzE 28, 29-33 (Peter W.
Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991); Anita Bernstein, A Model of ProductsLiabilityReform, 27
VAL. U. L. REv. 637, 637-39 (1993).
As a new Torts teacher, I can also recommend a simple reading through a Torts casebook
section on product liability law.
33. Consider Judge Richard Posner's influential opinion in Navarrov. FujiHeavy Industries,
Ltd., 117 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 1997) (arguing that "there is little or no practical difference in
a case of defective design" between strict product liability or a negligence standard of liability). See
also Richard L. Cupp, Jr. & Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict ProductsLiability Versus
Negligence: An Empirical Analysis, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 874, 899-900 (2002) (arguing that the
negligent and defective design theories have collapsed into each other, and noting court rhetoric
to the opposite effect).
There is also disagreement about the state of product liability law. Some argue that product
liability law has settled into predictability and sameness. See, e.g., James A. Henderson, Jr. &
Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus On Defective ProductDesign, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867,
868-72 (1998). For an argument that product liability law is still a bloody mess, see RICHARD
NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS 46 (1988) (noting product liability law's "lack of
uniformity, lack of predictability, and lack of consistency"); OLSON, supra note 18, at 152-77
(same).
34. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Casefor
EnterpriseLiability, 91 MACH. L. REV. 683, 695-706 (1993) (describing the change and growth in
manufacturer liability).
35. The costs of product liability law have been widely disputed. For a great overview of
these disputes, the multiple numbers attached to every aspect of the system, and an argument that
most of the estimates have been greatly exaggerated, see Marc Galanter, News FromNowhere: The
Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENV. U. L. REv. 77, 83-90 (1993). For an opposing
calculation, see PETER W. HUBER, THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 3-5 (1988).
For a more recent high end calculation, see BEACON HILL INST., TAXATION BY LITIGATION: THE
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this era ushered in a whole new way for companies and the public to think
about product safety and manufacturer liability.
The shift in societal mores during this time was probably more
significant than the doctrinal shift.3 6 Whether you call it the "lawsuit
culture" 37 or a salutary emphasis on safety, there is little doubt that

Americans in general (and more specifically manufacturers and lawyers)
began to look at products differently. A uniquely lawyerly pursuit (looking
at a product or activity and trying to spin out its worst case scenario or
potential risks) became something of a national pastime.38
From the tort reform/innovation perspective, however, it is interesting
to note that for the last hundred years or so, industrial liability for injuries
to customers has continuously expanded.39 While it is hard to measure
?with pinpoint accuracy given the American economic performance in the
twentieth century, it would be hard to argue that this expansion of liability
has crushed American innovation over the same period, especially in
comparison to other legal regimes. Nevertheless, the latest expansion in
product liability and its parallel psychological shift has been highly
controversial, and there have been persistent cries for tort reform since the
1980s. The overarching costs and benefits of the current system have been
the front line of this war, and one critical battleground is the reformers'
claim that product liability and tort laws hamper American manufacturer
innovation.'
This claim, like many of the tort reformers' arguments, begins with a
powerful, intuitive story.4" Product liability law has grown so expensive

ECONOMICS OFCIVILJUSTICE REFORM INMASSACHUSETTS (1998). For a rebuttal of the newer highend figures, see Robert S. Peck et al., Tort Reform 1999: A Building Without a Foundation,27 FLA.

ST. U. L. REV. 397, 420-33 (2000).
36. Cf Symposium, RationalActors or RationalFools? The Implications ofPsychologyfor
ProductsLiability,6 ROGER WILIAMS U. L. REv. 1 (2000) (describing the intersection of cognitive
psychology and product liability law).
37. For a full description of this term, and a forceful argument that the "lawsuit culture" has
deeply negative effects, see HOWARD, supra note 19, at 155-66.
38. For a great history of this phenomenon from the consumer perspective, see Martha
Chamallas, The DisappearingConsumer,Cognitive Bias and Tort Law, 6 ROGER WILLIAMs U. L.
REV. 9, 10-13 (2000).
39. The last ten years or so may mark a small retrenchment. For some raw product liability
numbers, see Joachim Zekoll, American Law in a Time of GlobalInterdependence: U.S. National
Reports to the XVIth InternationalCongressof ComparativeLaw: Section II: LiabilityforDefective
Products and Services, 50 AM. J.COMP. L. 121, 148-49 (2002) (reporting that the number of
personal injury product liability filings in federal courts grew from 2,393 in 1975 to 32,856 in 1997
and then tapered to 26,886 in 1998, 18,781 in 1999, and 14,428 in 2000). See also Frank J. Vandall,
ConstrictingProductsLiability:Reforms in Theory and Procedure,48 VuLL.L. REv. 843, 865-71
(2003) (listing some of the legal changes that have led to the product liability retrenchment).
40. See supra notes 16, 18, and accompanying text.
41. Although one would assume that the rise of law and economics and its application to tort
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and pervasive that companies frequently will not risk releasing new,
innovative products for fear of unforeseen liability. For example, Peter
Huber argues that product liability law favors established products, with
known risks and benefits, over risky new products.4 2 The reformers also

argue that liability
fears have driven necessary and beneficial products off
43
the market.

law would result in more rigorous and scientific scholarly thinking, it actually has resulted in the
reign of the intuitive story. One of the tort reformers' greatest challenges is to overturn the intuitive
story that underlies almost all of law and economics' treatment of torts: that both the negligence
and design defect standards encourage optimal levels of public safety. Beginning in the 1970s,
Richard Posner, among others, began a spirited defense of the Learned Hand formula for
determining liability in negligence. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d
Cir. 1947) ("Possibly it serves to bring this notion [of negligence law] into relief to state it in
algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends
upon whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL."). Posner argued that this legal
standard of negligence created a "formula for optimal accident avoidance." See RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 167-70 (6th ed. 2003) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS]. For one of the original formulations of this view by Posner, see RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw § 4.2, at 69-97 (1st ed. 1972).
Note that Posner and others consider the design defect cost-benefit analysis to be identical to
the Hand formula for negligence, so the "optimal cost avoider" analysis applies equally to design
defects. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra, at 182-83. Posner's analysis is remarkably
straightforward: If product liability law truly captures the potential cost of making any product
design safer, and then balances it against the potential societal benefits of the safer design, only
those companies that under-invest in safety will be held liable. See id. As a matter of economic
theory one would expect companies to react to design defect cases by investing optimally in safety:
Any safety innovation that will cost less than the potential benefit to the firm's customers will be
adopted. See EPSTEIN, supranote 15, § 4.5, at 93-95 (providing similar analysis for both negligence
and product liability).
42. See HUBER, supra note 18, at 14-15, 155-61; see also MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 649 (1990) (asserting that the United States' product
liability system "is so extreme and uncertain as to retard innovation"); La Fetra, supra note 18, at
646-54 ("It is as though an anvil labeled 'potential tort liability' swings precariously over any
inventor, manufacturer, or business that dares to deviate from current knowledge and technology.");
Man C. Maloo & Benjamin A. Neil, Products Liability Exposure: The Sacrifice of American
Innovation, 13 J. PROD. LIAB. 361,362 (1991) ('The fear of products liability lawsuits, and a legal
system which encourages their institution and permits huge damage awards, are having a chilling
effect on technological innovation .. ");0. Lee Reed & John L. Watkins, ProductLiability Tort
Reform: The Case for Federal Action, 63 NEB. L. REV. 389, 438-43 (1984) (same); Dick
Thornburgh, America's Civil Justice Dilemma: The Prospectsfor Reform, 55 MD. L. REV. 1074,
1078 (1996) ("The threat of liability has significantly inhibited the product development and
innovation needed to provide improved services to consumers and to assure a leadership role for
our economy worldwide.").
43. Gregory Brian Butler & Brian David Miller, Fiddling While Rome Bums: A Response
to Dr. Hensler, 75 JUDICATURE 251, 252-53 (1992) (arguing that the civil justice system causes
manufacturers to desert markets where liability risks outweigh potential gains); Peter W. Huber &
Robert E. Litan, Overview, in THE LIABILITY MAZE, supra note 32, at 2 ("[W]hen the legal costs
of certain kinds of accidents are prohibitively high and unpredictable, entire sectors of enterprise
shut down.").

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006

11

Florida Law Review,
Vol. 58, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

In addition to the intuitive arguments, reform advocates rely upon a
series of anecdotes of industries or products that have been crippled by
product liability." The two classic examples are vaccines and small
aircraft. In the 1980s producers of both small aircraft and certain vaccines
pulled out of the market or greatly reduced their output because of
litigation concerns.45
44. It is interesting just how much of the tort reform argument is built on anecdote, since one
of the tort reformers' most persuasive arguments against our current system is the unpredictability
of using juries to find liability and set damages in tort cases. A regular feature in these criticisms
is how juries are easily swayed by anecdotes and sob stories. See, e.g., STEPHEN DANIELS & JOAN
MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICs OF REFORM 5 (1995) (discussing the jury's role in tort
"horror stories"); HUBERsupra note 18, at 41-44 (criticizing the role of the jury in complex design
defect cases); OLSON, supra note 18, at 173-75 (decrying the jury's role in the randomness of tort
litigation). Nevertheless, tort reform advocates themselves rely almost wholly on a series of
opposing anecdotes to make their case. For example, Philip Howard's The Collapseofthe Common
Good does not begin with statistics showing the growth in tort litigation or its overall societal cost.
See HOWARD, supra note 19, at 3-4; see also MARK C. RAHDERT, COVERING ACCIDENT COSTS:
INSURANCE, LIABILITY, AND TORT REFORM 119-21 (1995) (noting jury sympathy with plaintiffs
over defendants); Murray Mackey, Liability,Safety, and Innovationin the Automotive Industry, in
THE LIABILITY MAZE, supra note 32, at 191, 201-02 (noting with disapproval the prevalence of
juries in American civil trials); David E. Bernstein, ProceduralTort Reform: Lessons from Other
Nations, 19 REGULATION 71, 73-76 (1996), availableat http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/
regl9nle.html (last visited June 1, 2005) (condemning "inconsistent, almost random jury
verdicts"). The Economist magazine's favorable review of Howard's book called it "a rich seam
of anecdote." Common Good, Selected Reviews, http://cgood.org/learn-reading-other-booklist28.html (last visited June 1, 2005). Walter Olson's The LitigationExplosion similarly begins with
an anecdote set in a Long Island hospital. See OLSON, supra note 18, at 15. Years of struggling
against the current tort system seem to have subconsciously imprinted the system itself on the
critics. By analogy, consider George Foreman's transformation from an angry, glowering
heavyweight before fighting Muhammad Ali, to the almost goofy personality that emerged years
later. It was as if Ali beat his own personality into Foreman. See WHEN WE WERE KINGS (Polygram
Filmed Entertainment 1996).
45. For a discussion of the vaccine problem, see John P. Wilson, The Resolution of Legal
Impedimentsto the ManufactureandAdministrationofan AIDS Vaccine, 34 SANTACLARAL. REV.
495,504-45 (1994), which describes litigation over vaccines and discusses vaccine manufacturers
that left the market. See also HUBER, supra note 18, at 156 (discussing the decrease in the number
of U.S. vaccine manufacturers as a result of product liability litigation). The deleterious effects of
product liability on aircraft production are featured in no fewer than three chapters in Product
Liabilityand Innovation. Benjamin A. Cosgrove, Innovation, EngineeringPractice,andProduct
Liability in CommercialAviation,in MANAGINGRISK, supra,at 113; Frederick B. Sontag, Indirect
Effects of Product Liability on a Corporation, in MANAGING RISK, supra, at 68, 69; Bruce E.
Peterman, General Aviation Engineering in a Product Liability Environment, in PRODUCT
LiABmirY AND INNOVATION: MANAGING RISK IN AN UNCERTAIN ENVIRONMENT 62 (Janet R.

Hunziker & Trevor O. Jones eds., 1994) [hereinafter MANAGING RISK]; see also Jack B. Weinstein,
Compensationfor Mass Tort Delicts: Evolving Roles ofAdministrative, Criminal,and Tort Law,
2001 U. IIL. L. REV. 947, 970 (2001) ("Private litigation may also chill scientific innovation and
create high transaction costs for victims and society at large. A 1991 ALI study suggested that the
tort system, combined with administrative regulation, might over-deter development of
technologically complex products such as drugs, vaccines, and aircrafts [sic]."). The withdrawal
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These are strange examples, however, since both the small aircraft and
vaccine industries have been aided by industry-friendly federal
legislation. 46 Further, it may be that certain types of small aircraft
production should be halted. Peter Huber's aviation/innovation anecdote
is both telling and humorous:
America, land of the Wright brothers, has lost even its
appetite for innovation in small planes. Burt Rutan, the
pioneering designer of the Voyager, didn't have the resources
to compete with larger manufacturers, but he had a cheaper
way of getting his products out into the marketplace. He sold
construction plans for novel airplanes to do-it-yourselfers,
who built the planes in their garages.But in 1985, fearful of
the lawsuits that would follow if a home-built plane based on
his designs crashed, he stopped selling the plans.47
Really? Someone thought that selling innovative plane designs, to be built
in someone's garage and then flown over an unsuspecting public, was a
bad idea? Even assuming the designs were safe, why would Rutan
possibly believe that an innovative plane could be safely built in
someone's garage? This example actually proves the rule: Product liability
concerns deterred an unreasonably dangerous activity. 8
of the morning sickness drug Benedectin in the face of multiple law suits (including some finding
and some denying liability) is also a classic chestnut. See Robert E. Litan, The LiabilityExplosion
andAmerican Trade Performance:Myths and Realities,in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
127, 145 (Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991); La Fetra, supra note 18, at 653. Another frequently cited
example of product liability restricting a new product is Monsanto's decision "not [to] market an
already patented phosphate fiber asbestos substitute because of the liability risk." W. Kip Viscusi
& Michael Moore, Rationalizingthe Relationshipbetween Product Liability and Innovation, in
TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra, at 105, 106 [hereinafter Viscusi & Moore,
Rationalizing]. This example, however, proves the opposite. Perhaps the marketing of a
replacement product on the heels of one of the single biggest product liability disasters in history
is not such a great idea. If there ever was a product that required careful vetting before public
release, it would be an asbestos substitute.
46. The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 imposed a national statute of repose for
airline manufacturers. See Pub. L. No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101
(2000)). In 2001 Congress passed a comprehensive law governing vaccine production and payments
to anyone injured by a vaccine. See Pub. L. No. 99-660, § 311, 100 Stat. 3755 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1, 300aa- 11 (2000)).
47. HuBER, supra note 18, at 156 (emphasis added); see also VERA FOSTER ROLLO, BURT
RuTAN: RE-VENTING THE AiRPLANE (1991) (detailing Burt Rutan's innovative plane designs).
48. Compare Rutan's activity to the nineteenth century cases imposing strict liability upon
hot air ballooning as an unusually dangerous activity. Apparently in the nineteenth century, hot air
ballooning was so dangerous that it was not unusual for hot air balloons to come crashing out of
the sky in cities and other populated locales. Judge Posner has a great description of the early
American ballooning case Guille v. Swan in Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co. v. American
Cynamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1176-77 (7th Cir. 1990) (discussing Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. Ch.
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Outside of the anecdotal evidence, the tort reformers rely on two pieces
of empirical evidence. First, reformers frequently cite to a 1988
Conference Board survey's finding that more than a third of surveyed
CEOs reported that product liability had a "major impact" on their
businesses, and a smaller share reported abandoning a new product
because of liability fears.49 Marc Galanter has made short work of this data
on multiple occasions.5" Suffice it to say that this survey was
commissioned in direct response to an earlier Conference Board survey
showing little economic effect and overall improved safety.5"
The second set of empirical data is much more reliable, but also harder
to confidently interpret. Professors W. Kip Viscusi and Michael J. Moore52
wrote three roughly contemporaneous articles between 1991 and 1993,
attempting to measure empirically the correlation between product liability
law and innovation.53 Each article uses different measures for innovation

381 (N.Y. Ch. 1822)).
49. E. Patrick McGuire, The Impact of ProductLiability, Conf. Board Rep. No. 908, 6-20
(1988) (showing that out of 500 United States companies, four out of ten CEOs believe that the
product liability system has had a major impact on their business; half said product liability has a
major impact on the competitiveness of United States firms; two-thirds expect matters to get
worse).
50. See Marc Galanter, The Life and Times of the Big Six; Or, The FederalCourtsSince the
Good Old Days, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 921, 941-42 & n.79 [hereinafter Galanter, Big Six]; Marc
Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: ContemporaryLegends About the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ.
L. REV. 717, 741-43 (1998); Marc Galanter, Shadow Play: The Fabled Menace of Punitive
Damages, 1998 WIs. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (1998).
51. See Galanter, Big Six, supra note 50, at 942 n.79 ("[A] 1986 Conference Board survey
of the risk-managers of major United States corporations... found that product liability impinges
in a major way only on a small number of specialized firms ....
Surprise with the sanguine
response of the [survey] respondents led the Conference Board to undertake 'a broader look at the
effect of product liability on overall company operations'...." (quoting McGuire, supra note 49,
at v)).
52. W. Kip Viscusi is the John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor of Law and Economics at the Harvard
Law School and the Director of Harvard's program on empirical legal studies. See W. Kip Viscusi,
Faculty Homepage, Harvard Law School, http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/
facdir.php?id=77 (last visited Apr. 1, 2005). Michael J. Moore is the Bank of America Research
Professor at the University of Virginia's Darden School of Business. See Michael J. Moore, Faculty
Homepage, Darden Graduate School of Business Administration, http://www.darden.virginia.
edu/faculty/mooremi.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2005). Viscusi and Moore collaborated on several
articles attempting to discern an empirical relationship between product liability law and
innovation. See sources cited infra note 53.
53. See W. Kip Viscusi & Michael Moore, An IndustrialProfileofthe Links between Product
Liability and Innovation, in THE LIABILITY MAZE, supra note 32, at 81 [hereinafter Viscusi &
Moore, IndustrialProfile]; Viscusi & Moore, Rationalizing,supranote 45, at 105; W. Kip Viscusi
& Michael Moore, Product Liability, Research and Development, and Innovation, 101 J. POL.
ECON. 161, 161-62 (1993) [hereinafter Viscusi & Moore, Research & Development]. By the way,
it has long been rumored that even the most successful legal scholars basically revive and
regurgitate three or four ideas into different permutations over the course of their careers. Do

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/1

14

2006]

Barton: Tort Reform, Innovation, and Playground Design
TORT REFORM, INNOVATION, AND PLAYGROUND DESIGN

(research and development data,54 patent, and product change data55), and
measures innovation against product liability costs. All three of the articles
basically reach the same conclusion: "At low product liability cost levels,
increases in liability costs foster innovation. Extremely high liability costs
depress innovation once the disincentive
effect on new product
' 56
introductions becomes dominant.
Viscusi and Moore admit that innovation is difficult to measure
empirically. 57 They also admit that the fact that high liability costs deter
innovation may be evidence that the product liability system actually is
working.58 Product liability law is supposed to inhibit the manufacture of
especially dangerous products at the margin,59 and presumably industries
with high liability costs are especially dangerous.' These empirical studies
have not proven to be showstoppers on the question of whether product
liability law deters innovation. For example, Viscusi and Moore's work
has been alternatively cited in support of the proposition that product
liability encourages innovation, 6' and, conversely, discourages

famous economists do the same thing? Read the above and make your own call.
54. See Viscusi & Moore, Research & Development, supra note 53, at 168-69.
55. See Viscusi & Moore, Industrial Profile, supra note 53, at 84-93 (using research and
development data as a validity check against the patent and product development data); Viscusi &
Moore, Rationalizing, supra note 45, at 115-22.
56. Viscusi & Moore, Rationalizing, supra note 45, at 123; see also Viscusi & Moore,
Industrial Profile, supra note 53, at 114 ("Tort liability does, however, have safety incentive
effects. Higher levels of liability costs usually increase product-related research and development.
However, extremely high levels of liability dampen innovation as firms reduce their focus on new
product development."). Viscusi & Moore, Research &Development, supranote 53, at 182-83, has
a slightly darker take on the correlation: "Product liability costs increase product R & D intensity
initially, but the effect eventually becomes negative."
57. See, e.g., Viscusi & Moore, Research & Development, supra note 53, at 167-68 (finding
that although the different components of the innovation process-safety innovations and product
novelty-may respond differently to increasing liability costs, they cannot be isolated empirically
to distinguish the competing effects).
58. See Viscusi & Moore, IndustrialProfile, supra note 53, at 82 ("[Product liability law]
should lead to the development of safer products and, in some cases, the discontinuation of research
on very risky new products."); Viscusi & Moore, Rationalizing, supra note 45, at 106 ("An
effective liability system should lead to some withdrawal of products, [and] decreased product
introductions ....
").
59. Cf POSNER, supra note 41, at 182-83 (describing how product liability law raises the
price of more dangerous products on average, and causes consumers to choose safer products).
60. Of course, this is exactly where tort reform advocates (and probably Viscusi and Moore)
object. Tort reformers love the vaccine and small aircraft anecdotes precisely because the high
liability costs of these products seem undeserved.
61. See Daniel J. Capra, 'An Accident and a Dream:' Problems with the Latest Attack on the
Civil Justice System, 20 PACE L. REv. 339, 358 & n.107 (2000) (citing Viscusi & Moore,
Rationalizing, supra note 45) (arguing that "W. Kip Viscusi and Michael J. Moore are two
respected researchers who also conclude that liability lawsuits do not stifle the development of
better and safer products"); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L.
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innovation. 62
Nor has the battle of the anecdotes proven to be very satisfactory.
Defenders of product liability have a simple in-kind response to the
examples of small aircraft or orphan drugs: Take a walk through your local
grocery store, or Home Depot, or CompUSA and decide whether you think
the tort system has crippled innovation in today's economy. 63 This is, by
definition, unscientific, but the sheer volume of new and better products
alone makes one question any negative correlation between product
liability law and innovation. 6'
Even the defenders of the current system, however, basically balance
enhanced safety against any other loss of innovation as a result of product
liability.65 When they say product liability law may encourage innovation,
they mean safety innovations.66 My thinking on playground design has led
me to make a broader claim: The firms that reacted to product liability by
broadly rethinking and redesigning their dangerous products did more than
increase safety, they actually created better, more innovative products
across the board.67
REV. 1093, 1147 & n.217 (1996) (citing Viscusi & Moore, Rationalizing,supra note 45) (arguing
that an "analysis by W. Kip Viscusi and Michael J. Moore found that product liability actually had
a positive net effect on innovation").
62. Viscusi himself has used his research to support various product liability reforms. See W.
Kip Viscusi, Productand OccupationalLiability,5 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 88-89 (1991) (arguing that
product liability law chills innovation and relying partially on previous empirical work); W. Kip
Viscusi, The Social Costs ofPunitive DamagesAgainst Corporationsin EnvironmentalandSafety
Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285, 325-27 (1998) (using his previous empirical work to argue that punitive
damages discourage innovation).
63. These comparisons may be between apples and oranges, however: Vaccines and airplanes
clearly are more complex products than most consumer goods.
64. See RAHDERT, supra note 44, at 161 ("The rapid proliferation of new products and
services in our economy is ample evidence that stagnation due to tort liability is the exception, not
the rule."); Peck et al.,
supra note 35, at 441-42 (same).
65. See Mary L. Lyndon, Tort Law and Technology, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 137, 148-70 (1995)
(arguing for the importance of broad research and development on potential product dangers and
asserting that the current product liability system provides the best safety incentives); Peck et al.,
supranote 35, at 441 ("While other commentators, especially Peter W. Huber, have suggested that
liability discourages innovation ... others recognize that tort liability does have safety incentive
effects.").
66. See Peck et al., supra note 35, at 441.
67. Now seems like an appropriate time to respond to the inevitable complaint that my
Article adds nothing more than additional intuitive stories and anecdotes to this debate. Any
skeptical reader has howled by now: "This is all anecdotal! There is nothing empirical here! This
is no argument at all." I have two responses. First, the entire academic study of innovation and
product liability has been almost entirely anecdotal. In fact, if W. Kip Viscusi and Michael J.
Moore had never been born, I would feel comfortable claiming that there are no true empirical
studies in the area at all. I therefore feel supremely confident positing my anecdotes and intuitive
arguments against my detractors. Since we are neighbors in glass houses we should get along very
well. Second, as noted above, even the attempts at measuring innovation empirically are rough
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"Y2K EFFECT," SCHUMPETERIAN ECONOMICS, AND THE
INNOVATIVE EFFECTS OF POTENTIALLY CRIPPLING DISASTERS

II. THE

In a market economy, innovative firms will react to foreseen business
liabilities by turning lemons into lemonade: They will find ways to address
liabilities that also increase overall efficiency, or productquality, or both.
Assuming all competing firms in the market are equally affected by the
foreseen liability, it will be the firms that most successfully innovate that
will thrive. This Part explains how product liability law actually fosters
innovation in certain circumstances.68 I use the "Y2K crisis" and its
aftermath as a case study and supporting evidence.69
I choose the Y2K crisis as an apt comparison to the product liability
revolution for several reasons. First, both Y2K and the change in product
liability law were generally known to businesses in advance of any direct
impact on the balance sheet.7" Some Y2K problems occurred before the
year 2000, and some liability costs were paid out as the law expanded, but
in both circumstances, most businesses and the government were acting
in advance of foreseen potential financial hardships. The Y2K problem,
and its subsequent positive effect on the economy, has thus been studied
as a model of innovative businesses taking a foreseen liability and turning
it into a large benefit.7"
Second, the Y2K experience shows how counter-intuitive trends in
innovation and in the economy can be. The predictions for the Y2K
disaster ranged from a full-on biblical apocalypse, to an international
computer network meltdown.72 Even the more sanguine commentators
approximations and come to no hard conclusions. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. Since
the empirical data is not conclusive, I feel fine about engaging in some anecdotal speculation.
68. I use the phrase "certain circumstances" here because I think that both sides of the tort
reform debate tend to overstate the effects (positive or negative) of product liability law. See supra
note 35 and accompanying text. Here, "certain circumstances" exist when litigation or safety
concerns are significant enough to cause a substantial product redesign.
69. 1 put the term "crisis" in quotes because in retrospect, the entire Y2K problem was
overblown. For an overview of what the Y2K problem was, see, for example, MARK A. KELLNER,
Y2K: APOCALYPSE OR OPPORTUNITY (1999).
70. Y2K required businesses to replace defective hardware and software before the year
2000. See id. The products liability revolution did not include a looming deadline, but
manufacturers knew ahead of time that liability for injury-causing products was expanding rapidly,
and a new focus on safety, testing, and warnings would be necessary.
71. See, e.g., Mark C. Anderson et al., Y2K Spending by EntrepreneurialFirms,20 J. ACCT.
&PuB. POL'Y 323 (2001) (analyzing the spending practices of firms on information technology (IT)
applications in the context of the Y2K situation and studying these practices from the viewpoint
of the evolutionary economics of Joseph A. Schumpeter); Jonathan Story & Robert J. Crawford,
Y2K: The Bug That Failed to Bite, 3 Bus. & POL. 269 (2001) (studying Y2K as an example of
global business practices).
72. See, e.g., KELLNER, supra note 69, at 43-56 (1999) (business meltdown); Barnaby J.
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estimated stunning costs to repair the potential Y2K difficulties, and the
possibility of a Y2K fueled recession. 7 The Y2K recession theory was
based on the sheer size of the remedial efforts, the transfer of information
technology (IT) resources to Y2K compliance, and the possibility of mass
computer failures on January 1, 2000. 74 Intuitively, these predictions made
perfect sense: Every dollar spent on remediating the Y2K problem was a
dollar diverted from other information technology or research and
development uses.
Of course, those who predicted a Y2K recession were completely
wrong. Not only were they wrong technically (there were not worldwide
computer meltdowns), they were wrong theoretically. The expense of
fixing the Y2K problem turned out to be a tremendous benefit for the
economy instead of a detriment. Many companies responded to Y2K by
reassessing and redesigning their IT functions rather than simply patching
their existing software and hardware.75 Instead of a Y2K recession, Y2K
helped usher in a productivity boom.7 6

Feder & Andrew Pollack, World Preparesfor Possible Y2K Glitches, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Dec. 27, 1998, at 22A (same); Videotape: Y2K Chaos (Ed Wheeler, The Prophesy Club
1998) (Y2K video suggesting a biblical apocalypse).
73. The Y2K cost predictions ranged from $600 billion to $1.6 trillion. See EDNA FERGUSON
REID, WHY 2K?: A CHRONOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE (Y2K) MILLENNIUM BUG 2-3 (1999). For a
Y2K recession prediction, see ROBERT G. LOGAN, DOUBLE WHAMMY: Y2K AND THE COMING
RECESSION 15-40 (1999); Bradley D. Belt, Y2K: A Global Ticking Time Bomb?, CSIS CAPITAL
MARKETS, June 23, 1998, http://www.csis.org/html/cm062398.htmil.
74. The leading economist on this front was Deutsche Bank's Edward Yardeni. See James
Glassman, The Apocalypse When?, DENVER POST, Dec. 6, 1998, at H2 ("Edward Yardeni of
Deutsche Bank Securities sees the Y2K problem causing a recession that will cut gross domestic
product by 5 percent over two years and send stocks down 30 percent."). Based on his career
trajectory, it appears that his mistaken analysis may have proven at least somewhat costly. Mary
Beth Regan, Ticking Down to the MillenniumBug, How Ready Are We?, ATLANTAJ. CONST., Dec.
20, 1998, at RI ("Today, the Y2K computer problem is devouring 60 percent of the world's
information technology resources. And the price tag for fixing Y2K glitches is expected to surpass
$1.2 trillion worldwide. Economists don't agree on the implications of the resource drain, but at
least one prominent economist, Edward Yardeni, chief economist at Deutsche Banks Securities Inc.
in New York, has put chances of the Y2K bug causing a global recession at 70 percent."); see also
Carolyn Leitch, Y2K PredictorChanges Jobs, GLOBE & MAIL, Sept. 8, 2004, at B 15 (announcing
Yardeni's move from Wall Street to a firm in Akron, Ohio).
75. See U.S. S. SPEC. COMM. ON THE YEAR 2000TECH. PROBLEM, 106TH CONG., REPORT ON
Y2K AFTERMATH-CRISIS AVERTED, 17-18 (Comm. Print 2000), available at
http:/www.senate.gov/-y2kldocuments/finaLpdf [hereinafter Y2K AFrERMATH]. Interestingly, if
these companies had simply patched their existing hardware and software the Y2K remediations
likely would have been a disaster. A great deal of time and money would have been spent with no
concomitant productivity growth. See id.
76. See, e.g., Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Vice-Chairman, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Speech at the Stockton Lectures, London Business School, (Oct. 24, 2002), in Productivity
Growth-A Realistic Assessment, Bank for International Settlements Review, available at
http://www.bis.org/review/r021028d.pdf (noting the potential connection between Y2K and the
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Economist Chris Farrell offers a pithy explanation of the discrepancy
between what economists and others thought would happen, and what
actually did happen:
Economists initially looked at Y2K as a productivity
killer. Imagine a town threatened by a rising river. Every
able-bodied person in town is put to work stacking sandbags.
It's necessary work to save the town, but it's unproductive
work. Nothing gets built. No food gets grown.
With the Y2K bug, programmers, chief information
officers, project managers, and other digital workers were
getting paid to do unproductive work. In other words,
stacking sandbags of silicon. No innovative investments. No
new productivity enhancing software.
But economists were wrong. Y2K wasn't a flood.
Think of what happened as clearing a path choked with
underbrush.
Once the trail is open, it's much easier to zip from point
A to point B. Y2K gave companies an excuse to clean up
their software and hardware underbrush. That's77 a critical
factor in today's improved business productivity.
I call this the "Y2K effect," when expenditures to avert a potential
business liability result in unexpected benefits.78
There are three lessons to take away from the Y2K effect that are
directly applicable to product liability. The first is to be careful in
assessing costs and benefits of remediation efforts ex ante, because the
costs frequently are much easier to estimate than the benefits. In the case
of Y2K, it was easy to extrapolate the costs ahead of time: billions had to
be spent to deal with date protocols in defective hardware and software.79

productivity acceleration that occurred in the late 1990s).
77. See Chris Farrell, The Costs of Y2K, The Surprising Legacy of Y2K, available at
http://americanradioworks.publicradio.org/features/y2k/b2.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2005). For a
much less pithy explanation making the same point, see Kevin L. Kliesen, Was Y2K Behind the
Business Investment Boom and Bust?, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV., Jan./Feb. 2003, at 3 1,
37-41; cf. Robert J. Gordon, Technology andEconomic Performancein the American Economy 41
Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8771, 2002 (noting the acceleration in IT
spending from 1995-2000 and its effect on productivity).
78. This Y2K effect actually was noted by some IT professionals immediately before the year
2000. See Michael W. Bucken, Y2K Aftermath Should be a Boon to Users, APPLICATION DEV.
TRENDS, Feb. 1999, at 8 (arguing, before Y2K occurred, that IT spending on Y2K would have
substantial efficiency benefits); Lawrence A. Gordon & Martin P. Loeb, The Y2K Boon to IS and
Business, 16 INFO. SYS. MGMT. 57 (1999) (same). But see Stephanie Schmitt-Groh6 & Martin
Uribe, Y2K, 2 REv. ECON. DYNAMICS 850 (1999) (arguing that Y2K would cripple IT spending
based on a more pessimistic cost model).
79. Of course, even the cost predictions varied wildly. See Leon A. Kappelman, The
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The benefits, however, were much harder to predict because they
depended on the reactions of innumerable firms, their willingness to do
more than simply fix the narrow problem, and projections of potential
productivity gains. In such a situation we can expect that prognosticators
will systematically overestimate costs and underestimate benefits.80
The cost/benefit estimation problem is, if anything, more pronounced
in the product liability area, where costs (damages awards, legal fees,
product redesigns) are much easier to measure than the benefits (injuries
averted, improved safety).81 More cynically, in a politically charged
atmosphere the costs of product liability are easy to overstate and
manipulate, and the benefits easy to dismiss.8 2
Second, out of sheer inertia, outmoded technology, hardware, and
business practices frequently linger on well beyond their "expiration date."
The Y2K problem actually was a result of programmers in the 1970s and
1980s assuming their programs and hardware would never last until the
year 2000.83 As the post-Y2K boom has shown, these programmers were
right in principle-this IT never should have lasted that long. It took a
major problem like Y2K to force a change.8 Similarly, the product
liability revolution, and the concurrent societal focus on safety issues, has
brought about the redesign and replacement of a number of dangerous
products that remained on the market out of sheer inertia. Playgrounds are
one example, but it is also worth considering the safety advances in
multiple other products.8"
Economicsof Y2K: QuestionsandAnswers, 17 COMPUTERLAW. 11, 11-12(2000) (comparing cost
predictions to actual costs); Y2K AFrERMATH, supra note 75, at 11-12 (discussing the various final
cost estimates for Y2K).
80. This, of course, raises the broader issue of carefully checking our intuition against the
actual facts on the ground. Throughout this Article I have noted situations where economic
predictions have been based on extremely persuasive intuitive stories, only to fail when placed
against actuality. If economic projections were easy and intuitive there would be more billionaire
economists. Cf. NICHOLAS DUNBAR, INVENTING MONEY: THE STORY OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT AND THE LEGENDS BEHIND IT (2000) (telling the story of the disastrous crash of a
hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM), which was founded by two Nobel Prizewinning economists, Robert C. Merton and Myron Scholes); ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS
FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2000) (same).
81. For a great example of an effort to balance the costs and benefits in the medical
malpractice system, see generally Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the EconomicAnalysis of Tort Law:
Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994).
82. For an argument that the costs of the current tort system have been overstated, see Marc
Galanter, supra note 61, at 1140-43 (1996).
83. Feder & Pollack, supra note 72, at 22A.
84. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
85. Crib design is a great example. When my wife and I began shopping for cribs, I was
amazed to learn that former designs included gaps between the slats wide enough to allow a baby
to push her head through the bars and get stuck. See Women's Health, Nursery Furnishings,
http:/lwomenshealth.aetna.comWH/ihtWHIr.WSIHWOO0/st.36127/t.5090 2.html (recommending
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Third, never underestimate the capacity of entrepreneurial firms to turn
lemons into lemonade. Foreseen business liabilities offer entrepreneurial
firms the opportunity to rethink, redesign, and generally out-innovate their
competitors.86 The Y2K remediation resulted in new and improved IT
instead of a global recession.87 In some sectors the product liability
revolution has likewise spurred an overall reevaluation and redesign,
which resulted in increased safety8 and better products overall.89
A. Schumpeterian Economics, Entrepreneurship,
and Innovation
My argument about the behavior of innovative firms matches a great

only using cribs designed after 1985 and that if an older crib is used, the "[c]rib slats should be no
more than 2 3/8 inches (60 millimeters) apart to avoid trapping the infant's head."). Anyone who
has ever seen a curious or angry baby in a crib can foresee a baby jamming her head through the
bars of a crib. As my Mom once said: "It's like a prison in there, and it is all bets off for escape."
Given this foreseeability, there was no excuse for producing cribs with wider slats. Yet, these
designs remained on the market until the mid- 1980s. See id. Cars are another fine example. There
were many more automotive safety advances between 1960 and 2005 than in the preceding sixtyodd years of automotive history combined. For example, seat belts were not standard equipment
in cars until the mid-1960s. See Note, Oklahoma and the Seat Belt Defense: Should Fields be
Reconsidered?, 10 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 153, 157 (1985) (noting that seatbelts were standard
equipment as of 1966).
86. Of course some liabilities will be too great for any business to overcome (the avalanche
of lemons scenario). It is interesting to note, however, that even the tort reform advocates have
relatively few examples of business sectors flatly crushed, or even products pulled off the market
by the change in product liability law. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 44-51.
87. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
88. See generally GEORGE EADS & PETER REUTER, DESIGNING SAFER PRODUCTS:
CORPORATE RESPONSES TO PRODUCT LIABILTY LAW AND REGULATION (1983) (examining how
firms have responded to increased pressure to produce safe products).
89. Of course, measuring exactly what "better" means, especially vis-A-vis concrete costs,
is quite difficult. The difficulty in quantifying changes in quality is a problem recognized by
economists. See, e.g., ADVISORY COMMISSION TO STUDY THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, TOWARD
A MORE ACCURATE MEASURE OF THE COST OF LIVING, 18-38 (1996) (criticizing the Consumer

Price Index (CPI) and specifically noting the problem with "quality change bias"); Richard D.
Raymond, Potential Bias in the Estimation of Future Medical Care Costs: Empirical and
ConceptualIssues, 8 J. LEGAL ECON. 41, 44-46 (1998) (describing "quality change bias" and the
problem of dealing with quality changes in the construction of a price index and explaining that
"[t]o the extent that the CPI overweights mature products and underweights new products it will
tend to have an upward bias"). The CPI measures the prices of products over time, but has a
difficult time measuring changes in quality. See id. For example, the price of a refrigerator has risen
over time (and that change is measured by the CPI). Current refrigerators also are vastly superior
to older refrigerators. They break down less frequently, are better designed, and even are better
looking. These changes in quality are quite difficult to capture as a matter of dollars and cents. See
Robert J. Gordon & Zvi Griliches, Quality Change and New Products,87 AM. ECON. REV. 84, 8487 (1997); Paul R. Liegey & Nicole Shepler, Adjusting VCR Pricesfor Quality Change: A Study
Using HedonicMethods,MONTHLY LABOR REV., Sept. 1999, at 22 (noting difficulties in measuring
changes in quality, and attempting to do so for VCRs).
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deal of scholarly thought on the productivity boom, the "new economy,"
and the powerful economic effects of entrepreneurship. At the forefront of
this scholarship is a reawakening of interest in the economic theories of
Joseph A. Schumpeter. 9° Schumpeter is best known for his theories of
business cycles, and a process he dubbed "Creative Destruction."
Schumpeter rejected a static model of economic activity and argued that
markets were best understood as a roil of change, revolution, and creative
destruction as new firms and technologies displaced the old.9 1
Schumpeter's theories often are cited as fundamental to the modem study
of evolutionary economics 92 and entrepreneurship. 93

For our purposes, a key nugget from Schumpeter's work is the role of
entrepreneurs in the process of creative destruction. The firms that survive
and excel in times of technological change or business disruptions are
those that adapt and reorganize around the changed circumstances most
efficiently. 94 Schumpeter's work on entrepreneurship also was

90. Joseph Alois Schumpeter was an Austrian economist (and a lawyer) who emigrated to
the United States permanently in the 1930s to teach at Harvard University. See DAVID REISMAN,
SCHUMPETER'S MARKET: ENTERPRISE AND EVOLUTION 4-20 (2004) (providing a compressed
discussion of Schumpeter's life and work). For a full-on biography, see WOLFGANG F. STOLPER,
JOSEPH ALOIS SCHUMPETER (1994). Regarding the "new economy" and the recent reawakening of
interest in Schumpeter's work, see, for example, Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy,
68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925,930 (2001) ("The gale of creative destruction that Schumpeter described,
in which a sequence of temporary monopolies operates to maximize innovation that confers social
benefits far in excess of the social costs of the short-lived monopoly prices that the process also
gives rise to, may be the reality of the new economy.").

91. See JOSEPHA. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, ANDDEMOCRACY 83 (3d ed. 1950)
("The opening up of new markets... illustrate[s] the same process of industrial mutation-if I may
use that biological term-that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within,
incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative
Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism."). See generally MARIA BROUWER,
SCHUMPETERIAN PUZZLES: TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETITION AND

ECONOMIC

EVOLUTION

(1991)

(discussing Schumpeterian economics in relation to creativity and change).

92. See Hyman P. Minsky, Schumpeter: Financeand Evolution, in EVOLVING TECHNOLOGY
51, 60-65 (Arnold Heertje &

AND MARKET STRUCTURE: STUDIES IN SCHUMPETERIAN ECONOMICS

Mark Perlman eds., 1990) (discussing Schumpeter, entrepreneurial finance, and economic
evolution); Wolfgang F. Stolper, Development: Theory andEmpiricalEvidence, in EVOLUTIONARY
ECONOMICS 9, 9-22 (Horst Hanusch ed., 1988) (noting the centrality of Schumpeter and the
"International Schumpeter Society" to the study of evolutionary economics).
93. See generally ELIZABETH BOYLE & STEPHEN MEZIAS, ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS OF
CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE EMERGENCE OF INDUSTRIES (2002)
(applying Schumpeter' s theories of creative destruction and entrepreneurship to the new study of
organizational dynamics); ALLEN OAKLEY, SCHUMPETER'S THEORY OF CAPITALIST MOTION: A
CRITICALEXPOSITION AND REASSESSMENT

110-21 (1990) (discussing applications of Schumpeter's

theories of entrepreneurship).
94. Some of these disruptions are the result of entrepreneurial activity itself (endogenous),
and some come from outside the market (exogenous). See Sandye Gloria-Palermo, Schumpeterand

the Old Austrian School: Interpretations and Influences, in
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol58/iss2/1

THE CONTRIBUTION OF JOSEPH

22

Barton:
Tort
Reform,
Innovation,
and Playground
TORT
REFORM,
INNOVATION,
AND PLAYGROUND
DESIGN Design

groundbreaking because of its focus on the entrepreneur's psychological
profile.95
There also has been an increased empirical focus on entrepreneurs
recently, and Schumpeter's vision of a bold, inveterate risk-taker has been
well corroborated. Entrepreneurs have been found to be less risk-averse
than average, 96 over optimistic, 97 and motivated as much by a desire to
revolutionize their market niche as by profits. 98

SCHUIMPETER TO ECONOMICS 21, 25 (Richard Arena & Cecile Dangel-Hagnauer eds., 2002). The

reaction of entrepreneurs to disruptions is the key to Schumpeter's system. Schumpeter's
entrepreneurs are unusual, risk-seeking individuals with a special quality, driven by "the dream and
the will to found a private kingdom." JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 93 (Redvers Opie trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1961) (1934) [hereinafter
SCHUMPETER, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT]; see also Richard Arena & Paul-Marie Romani,
Schumpeter on Entrepreneurship,in CONTRIBUTION OF JOSEPH SCHUMPETER TO ECONOMICS,
supra, at 169-79 (exploring institutional applications of the Schumpeterian entrepreneur); Joseph
A. Schumpeter, The Creative Response in Economic History, 7 J. ECON. HIST. 149 (1947)
(describing the characteristics of creative response and explaining the function of the enterpreneur,
the theories of entrepreneurial gains, and the social impact of entrepreneurship).
95. Schumpeter does not simply describe the entrepreneur in terms of his effect upon the
economy; instead Schumpeter spends significant time discussing the entrepreneur's emotions and
motivations: The entrepreneur is motivated by "the will to conquer: the impulse to fight, to prove
oneself superior to others, to succeed for the sake . . . of success itself." See SCHUMPETER,
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 94, at 92-93; Andre Legris, On the Boundaries Between
Economic Analysis and Economic Sociology, in CONTRIBUTION OF JOSEPH SCHUMPETER TO
ECONOMICS 89,99-103 (describing Schumpeter's treatment of entrepreneurs and institutions). For
criticisms of Schumpeter's "heroic entrepreneur," see MARIABROUWER, SCHUMPETERIAN PUZZLES:
TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC EVOLUTION 51-53 (1991).
96. See, e.g., Richard E. Kihlstrom & Jean-Jacques Laffont, A General Equilibrium
EntrepreneurialTheory of Firm Formation Based on Risk Aversion, 87 J. POL ECON. 719, 719
(1979).
97. See Manuel A. Utset, Reciprocal Fairness,Strategic Behavior & Venture Survival: A
Theory of Venture Capital-FinancedFirms,2002 WIS. L. REV. 45, 100-07 (detailing literature and
studies concerning entrepreneuric/over optimism). This overoptimism means that entrepreneurs
who tend to rank their own competence at higher levels are more likely to succeed. See Gaylen N.
Chandler & Erik Jansen, The Founder's Self-Assessed Competence and Venture Performance,7
J. Bus. VENT. 223 (1992); Arnold C. Cooper et al., Entrepreneurs'PerceivedChancesforSuccess,
3 J. BuS. VENT. 97, 106 (1988) (conducting an empirical study that found that "[e]ntrepreneurs
perceive their prospects for success as substantially better than those for similar businesses"). A
number of studies also have shown that entrepreneurs tend to interpret facts more optimistically
than do non-entrepreneurs. See Leslie E. Palich & D. Ray Bagby, Using Cognitive Theory to
Explain EntrepreneurialRisk-Taking: Challenging ConventionalWisdom, 10 J. BUS. VENT. 425,
426 (1995) ("[Eintrepreneurs perceive[d] more strengths versus weaknesses, opportunities versus
threats, and potential for performance improvement versus deterioration.").
98. Cf. Donald D. Myers & Daryl J. Hobbs, Technical Entrepreneurs-AreThey Different?,
in FRONTIERS OFENTREPRENEuRIAL RESEARCH 1986,659, 670 (Robert Ronstadt et al. eds., 1986)
(finding in a survey of more than 1,000 entrepreneurs or individuals who showed interest in
entrepreneurship that 62.2% strongly agreed with the proposition that as an entrepreneur, you can
better control outcomes in your life); Thomas M. Begley & David P. Boyd, Psychological
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These characteristics are of particular interest to our study, because
risk-taking entrepreneurs generally are less affected by fear of litigation
or failure.' This helps explain two trends. First, it helps explain why the
product liability revolution actually has had a relatively circumscribed
effect on innovation across the economy. Simply put, both the opponents
and proponents of tort reform tend to frame their arguments as if the
current system has a powerful sway over all aspects of the economy. °°
While there is certainly empirical evidence to support the notion that
liability concerns matter,' ° there also is substantial evidence that the
actual effect on corporate decision-makers is relatively slight. °2
Second, it helps explain why those areas of the market that have been
more concerned with liability (drug manufacturing, product manufacturing
for children) have not hung their heads and given up. In the face of
increased liability, these industries have redoubled their efforts at
innovation. 03

CharacteristicsAssociated with Performance in EntrepreneurialFirms and Smaller Businesses,
2 J. Bus. VENT. 79, 81-82 (1987) (citing studies); James W. Carland et al., Differentiating
Entrepreneursfrom Small Business Owners: A Conceptualization,9 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 354,356
tbl.1 (1984) (same).
99. Cf. RITA GUNTHER MCGRATH & IAN MACMILLAN, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL MINDSET:
STRATEGIES FOR CONTINUOUSLY CREATING OPPORTUNITY INAN AGE OFUNCERTAINTY 1-21 (2000)
(describing the entrepreneurial mindset and making light of risk potential); REISMAN, supra note
90, at 1 ("Entrepreneurship is the propensity to pioneer new initiatives behind a veil of
unknowledge so thick that it conceals the competition, the bad luck and the shipwreck.").
100. The tort system's defenders point to increased safety and fairness across the entire
economy, while tort reformers describe a system that is choking the economy as a whole. Compare
Capra, supra note 61, at 343-408, with La Fetra, supra note 18, at 646-54. For a discussion of how
opponents and supporters of punitive damages differ over the impact of punitive damages on
corporate behavior, see Steven R. Salbu, Developing RationalPunitiveDamages Policies:Beyond
the Constitution,49 FLA. L. REV. 247, 250-60 (1997).
101. Consider the 1988 Conference Board survey's findings on the consequences of the
product liability system on management and operations. See McGuire, supra note 49, at 17-20
(reporting that product liability concerns have negatively affected introduction of products,
production of certain products, product research efforts, and product innovation).
102. Compare the Conference Board's 1986 survey to the 1988 survey cited above. See Nathan
Weber, ProductLiability: The CorporateResponse, The Conference Board Report No. 893, at 2
(1987) ("The [survey's] most striking finding is that the impact of the liability issue seems far more
related to rhetoric than to reality."); cf Joseph Bankman, The StructureofSilicon Valley Start-Ups,
41 UCLA L. REV. 1737, 1747-49 (1994) (arguing that empirical analysis indicates that venture
capitalists and entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley start-ups, surely high-risk ventures, operate in almost
complete oblivion of taxation issues).
103. See Viscusi & Moore, IndustrialProfile, supranote 53, at 94-98, 106-13 (discussing the
drug industry (among others) and noting that despite high liability costs, its liability innovation ratio
remained below the threshold where liability has a negative effect on research and development).
It is worth noting, however, that Viscusi and Moore did find that the liability costs of aircraft
manufacture were sufficiently high to fall above the negative correlation threshold (the avalanche
of lemons scenario). See id. at.113.
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B. The CalabresianArgument that ManufacturersAre the Most
Capableof Reacting Entrepreneuriallyto Unsafe Products
A focus upon the entrepreneurial nature of American business" offers
a modified Calabresian defense for the product liability system."t 5 In The
Costs of Accidents and in a series of law review articles, Guido Calabresi
offered his famous justification for strict liability over negligence in the
area of product liability: the cost of accidents should be shifted to the
"cheapest cost avoider," rather than worrying about fault °6 This places
the economic safety incentive where it can make the greatest difference."7
Since the cheapest cost avoider in a complex industrialized society
generally is the manufacturer or seller (because they have the most
concentrated information), strict product liability best serves societal
interests.108
By comparison, the Y2K effect suggests that we should consider more
than just the cheapest cost avoider; we should shift the costs of safety to
the party most likely to respond to safety incentives entrepreneurially. In
a Schumpeterian economy of entrepreneurial firms, we expect companies
to turn lemons into lemonade. In the realm of product liability, we expect
companies to use a safety redesign caused by fear of litigation (or actual
litigation) as an opportunity to design products that are not only safer, but

104. See FINANCING ENTREPRENEURS 31-43 (Cynthis A. Beltz ed., 1994) (arguing that the
abundance of venture capital and an entrepreneurial mindset are part of the United States'
considerable economic advantage); Myers & Hobbs, supra note 98, at 241-43 (same).
105. Jargon-haters beware. I amjust about to use "Calabresian" and "Schumpeterian" together
in the next paragraph. Live with it.
106. For the original and most comprehensive statement of the argument, see GUIDO
CALABRESi, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 135-73, 260-63 (1970). For shorter and clearer statements,
see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral,85 HARv. L. REV. 1089, 1096-1109 (1972) (arguing that considerations
of economic efficiency require placing the costs of accidents "on the party or activity which can
most cheaply avoid them"), and Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict
Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060 (1972) ('The strict liability test we suggest does not
require that a government institution make... a cost-benefit analysis. It requires... only a decision
as to which of the parties to the accident is in the best position to make the cost-benefit analysis
between accident costs and accident avoidancecosts and to act on that decision once it is made.
The question for the court reduces to a search for the cheapest cost avoider."). Obviously,
Calabresi's views have been controversial. Peter Huber, in particular, has laid much of the blame
for the tort crisis on Calabresi. See PETER W. HUBER, GALU.EO'S REVENGE 10-23 (1991). It also
may be that any Calabresian defense is inapplicable to current law because current product liability
law more closely resembles negligence than strict liability. See supra note 33 and accompanying
text.
107. See CAIABRESI, supra note 106, at 155.
108. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 106, at 1096-1109 (stating that strict product
liability benefits society because the cheapest cost avoider usually is the manufacturer or seller).
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substantively better. The Calabresian approach is thus amended to include
the possibility that the product liability system can encourage more than
just increased safety; it can offer incentives to redesign and revolutionize
whole product classes.
II. PLAYGROUND DESIGN-A CASE STUDY

I chose playground design as a case study of my product
liability/innovation theory for two main reasons. First, the change in
American playgrounds over the last thirty years has been so marked that
it presents a stark example of a product that has been radically altered by
safety concerns and product liability. Second, tort reformers have seized
upon playground design as support for their vision of a legal system gone
mad, and I find the challenge of a point/counterpoint irresistible.I°9
There are, however, some good reasons not to choose playground
design. It is not a pure product liability example, since plaintiffs frequently
sue the government entity providing the playground instead of, or in
addition to, the manufacturer/designer."' Further, the fact that the
government is the purchaser of public playground equipment may distort
the market somewhat. Despite these irregularities, I think the strengths
outweigh the weaknesses.
Tort reformers tell a very simple playground design story. Kids loved
seesaws and the traditional playground. Despite the children, evil
plaintiffs' lawyers and nanny-staters have stripped playgrounds of their
equipment and have diluted and wimpified the national identity."1 I want
to tell the opposite story: The old playgrounds were unfun deathtraps that
have been thankfully replaced by immensely more amusing and safer
playgrounds.
Unfortunately for both of us, the actual facts of the change in American

109. There also is a third, more selfish, reason: I am more interested in playground design than
the other products I could have chosen. Believe it or not, I get paid to think and write about this sort
of stuff. Thank you ABA and AALS! See ABA STANDARD FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 402
(2005), availableat http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/chapter4.htm (requiring "a sufficient
number of full-time faculty" and defining full time faculty as "one [who] ... devotes substantially
all working time during the academic year to [teaching and legal scholarship]"); BYLAWS OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS § 6-4 (2004) (requiring "a sufficient number of fulltime faculty members" and defining a full-time faculty member as one "who devotes substantially
the entire time to the responsibilities of teacher, scholar, and educator").
110. For example, in Reale v. Herco, Inc., 647 N.Y.S.2d 533 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996), the
plaintiff sued the playground owner and operator, who brought a third-party suit against GameTime, Inc., the slide's manufacturer. By comparison, in Dash v. City of New York, 654 N.Y.S.2d
33 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997), and Davidson v. Sachem Central School District, 751 N.Y.S.2d 300
(N.Y. App. Div. 2002), the plaintiff sued only the government entity, so the equipment
manufacturer was not involved.
111. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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playgrounds are much more complicated than either of our stories. The
American playground was first created as a reaction to the plight of
children growing up in the industrialized, urban centers of the late
nineteenth century."' The first playgrounds were meant primarily for
exercise and character-building among impoverished, urban youth.113 The
equipment on these playgrounds fit this austere, exercise-first model:
seesaws, swings, slides, and monkeybars. "4 John F. Kennedy's Council on
Youth Fitness further encouraged construction of traditional playgrounds
in the 1960s," 5 and this basic playground design remained the dominant
paradigm through the 1970s.16
Playground designers have long argued that this "traditional" paradigm
was deeply flawed. The basic criticism was that playgrounds ignored
children's play in favor of children's exercise." 7 As the study of cognitive
psychology and children's play has grown, a new field studying child
development and playgrounds has blossomed." 8 The upshot of these new

112. ERIKSEN, supra note 14, at 9-14; EDWARD ALAN HrIT, AN HISTORICAL STUDY OF THE
TRENDS IN PLAYGROUND DESIGN DEVELOPMENT 1885-1972, at 22-31 (1978).
113. See JAY B. NASH, THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF PLAYGROUNDS AND
RECREATION 7-16 (1928) (describing how playgrounds counter-acted the problems of the new
cities); PHILIP PREGILL & NANCY VOLKMAN, LANDSCAPES IN HISTORY: DESIGN AND PLANNING IN

THE WESTERN TRADITION 514-15 (1993) ("Last, and of equal importance to growth of the
playground movement, was the perception that through organized recreation, as through public
schools, non-English-speaking immigrants could be taught the values of hard work and selfreliance.").
114. Hrrr, supra note 112, at 28 (listing the above equipment in a "standard play area in the
1900s").
115. Johnson, supra note 14, at 1.

116. See BRETT ET AL., supra note 13, at 9-11 ("American playgrounds have traditionally
consisted of a concrete or asphalt surface with steel jungle gyms, merry-go-rounds, slides, and
swings...."); BUTLER, supra note 14, at 20-24 (listing the swing, the slide, the climbing structure,

and the see-saw among "common types of apparatus" in 1947); MarshaL. Galgano, The Historical
Development of Playground and Apparatus Design from 1930 to 1973 (May 1973) (unpublished

M.S. thesis, Smith College) (noting that as late as 1970 the U.S. was "building traditional parks and
playground areas-paving them, putting chain-link fences round them, buying the run-of-the-mill
equipment").
117. See BRETT ET AL., supra note 13, at 10-11 ("From a developmental point of view, the

traditional playground ignores many of the critical needs of children."); MARGUERITE ROuARD &
JACQUES SIMON, CHILDREN'S PLAY SPACES 13 (1977) (noting that "children rejected insufficient
and unimaginatively arranged" playgrounds, and that "children must have dynamic, stimulating
places filled with opportunities to exercise their sense of discovery").
118. SeeJOEL. FROST, AMERICAN PLAYGROUND MOVEMENT 178 (1985); JOEL. FROSTETAL,
THE DEVELOPMENTAL BENEFITS OF PLAYGROUNDS (2004) [hereinafter FROST, DEVELOPMENTAL

BENEFITS] (providing a great recent example of how a new field of study has emerged); JOE L.
FROST ET AL., PLAY AND CHID DEVELOPMENT (2001) (same); HENDRICKS, supra note 12 (same).

For a more nuts and bolts list of child development objectives in playground design, see PLAY FOR
ALL GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 3-4. Of course, criticism of the lack of play in American
playgrounds has been around almost as long as playgrounds themselves. See, e.g., NASH, supranote
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studies was a broad recognition that playgrounds should do more to
encourage group play, imaginative play, and child development in
general.119 There also were aesthetic critiques: "Comprising a collection
of isolated metal structures set upon a flat paved surface,
however, play
12
yards from this period evoke images of prison yards."
The death knell for the traditional playground was not persistent
criticism from designers and child development experts. Rather, the
traditional playground was done in by a combination of liability concerns
and regulatory measures from the Consumer Product Safety Commission
(CPSC). Beginning in the 1970s there was a dawning realization that
playgrounds were the cause of many serious childhood injuries and deaths.
In 1975 the CPSC published its first hazard analysis of playground
equipment, 12 and in 1981 the CPSC published its first Handbook for
Public Playground Safety.2 2 The Handbook had voluntary guidelines for
playground equipment and surfaces, and it has been periodically updated

113, at 29-60 (discussing "play and recreation objectives" in the 1920s and criticizing the exerciseonly approach).
119. See FROST, DEVELOPMENTALBENEFrrS, supra note 118, at 213 ("Because playgrounds
are built and designed for many users, it is important that we take into consideration the ways
children grow and develop, the ways children play, and the ways that playgrounds can support both
of these elements."); PLAY FOR ALLGUIDELINES, supranote 9, at 3-4 (outlining the "developmental
opportunities" that a "well-designed, well-managed play environment should provide [to]
children"); Pei-San Brown et al., Play is Essentialfor Brain Development, INT'L PLAY EQUIP.
MNFRS. ASS'N, May 27, 2004, http://www.ipema.org/News/default.aspx (discussing the profound
connection "between brain development and play").
120. See Johnson, supra note 14, at 1-2.
121. See U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM'N, BUREAU OF EPIDEMIOLOGY, HAZARD
ANALYSIS OFINJURiES RELATING TO PLAYGROUND EQUIPMENT 3-6(1975) [hereinafter CPSC, 1975
HAZARD ANALYSIS]. The story of the CPSC's work on playgrounds actually is a great
encapsulation of the history of the agency. The CPSC was created in 1972 pursuant to the
Consumer Product Safety Act. See Consumer Product Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 92-573,86 Stat. 1207
(1972) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2064 (2000)). One of the CPSC's first activities was the
creation of the National Electronic Injury Surveillance System (NEISS), which went online July
1,1972. See CPSC, 1975 HAZARD ANALYSIS, supra, at 4-6. The NEISS collected emergency room
data from 119 hospitals, and then extrapolated the data to derive product-related injury and death
statistics. See id. The first chunk of data was boiled down into a Hazard Index. Playground
equipment was ranked 8th. See id. This prompted the 1975 Report's more detailed study of
playground injuries, and eventually led to the CPSC's voluntary standards for playground
equipment. See id.
There have been three studies of public playground injuries since. See U.S. CONSUMER PROD.
SAFETY COMM'N, SPECIAL STUDY: INJURIES AND DEATHS ASSOCIATED WITH CHILDREN'S

PLAYGROUND EQUIPMENT 1-2 (2001) [hereinafter CPSC, 2001 SPECIAL STUDY]; U.S. CONSUMER
PROD. SAFETY COMM'N, PLAYGROUND EQUIPMENT-RELATED INJURIEs AND DEATHS 3-6 (1990);
U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM'N, HAZARD ANALYSIS REPORT: PUBLIC PLAYGROUND

EQUIPMENT (1979).
122. See CPSC, HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 1.
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since 1981.123 The CPSC's work in this area has spawned a veritable
alphabet soup of groups interested in playground safety, 1Iincluding an
industry group"' and a playground safety non-profit group. 5
The publication of the Handbook has had a tremendous effect upon
playground design and maintenance. While safety was an issue listed in
some earlier books on playgrounds, 126 the park and playground design
books of the last thirty years really have focused on safety and
maintenance issues. These books contain many more design specifications
(frequently straight from the Handbook), 127 and playground equipment
manufacturers now advertise that they follow the Handbook's
guidelines. 128 During the same period, lawsuits became more prevalent and
began to affect the decisions of schools and municipalities.' 29
123. See id.
124. The playground safety industry interest group is the International Play Equipment
Manufacturers Association (IPEMA). See IPEMA Home Page, http://www.ipema.org/ (last visited
May 1, 2005).
125. The playground safety non-profit interest group, the National Program for Playground
Safety (NPPS), was founded under a grant from the Center for Disease Control. See National
Program for Playground Safety Home Page, http://www.playgroundsafety.org/about/index.htm (last
visited May 1, 2005).
126. See NASH, supra note 113, at 99-102 (describing "safety suggestions" for playgrounds).
Nevertheless, other contemporary playground sources make no specific mention of safety concerns.
See LELAND & LELAND, supra note 14 (1910 book, no mention of "safety" in the index or table of
contents); BUTLER, supra note 14 (1947 book, same).
127. See PHILLIPS, supra note 9, at 27-32 (devoting an entire chapter to playground safety and
the CPSC Handbook); PLAY FOR AL GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 64-109 (describing
"manufactured play equipment settings" and citing to the CPSC handbook throughout).
128. See, e.g., Kaplan Early Learning Company, Playgrounds,http://www.kaplanco.com/
playgrounds/index.asp (last visited May 1, 2005) ("Our Sales Team and Installers are certified by
the National Playground Safety Institute, ensuring your project will meet all National Guidelines
as put forth by the Consumer Product Safety Commission and ASTM F- 1487 (American Society
for Testing
and
Materials).");
Park Structures
Homepage,
http://www.parkstructures.comaccessibility.iml (last visited May 1,2005) ("Adhering to and being
an active member in all industry safety-related associations such as IPEMA, ASTM, and CPSC
means your play system design not only meets guidelines, but that our sales agencies and
playground consultants are also up-to-date .... ); Progressive Design Playgrounds, Safety &
Standards,http://www.pdplay.com/safety.cfm (last visited May 1, 2005) ("The company takes a
proactive approach to safety compliance by continuously upgrading our products and creating new
outdoor play structures that meet or exceed United States and International safety requirements
including guidelines set forth by The International Playground Equipment Manufactures
Association (IPEMA), The Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) and ASTM
International.").
129. For a great overview of the case law in this area, see Edward Steinbrecher, When
Playtime Goes Wrong, TRIAL MAGAZINE,
July 2000, available at
http://www.seriousinjurylawyers.com/article-trialmag.html (discussing liability for children's
injuries on playgrounds); Edward M. Swartz, Litigating Children'sProducts Cases, C949 ALIABA 1,4 (1994) (discussing a number of injuries and deaths connected to playground equipment).
For a view from a school administrator, see JONATHAN RAUCH, GOVERNMENT'S END 106-07 (1999)
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The upshot of this new focus on liability and playground safety has
been a tremendous turnover in American playgrounds.13 Colorful,
modular play areas are replacing the "traditional" playground all over
America.131 Interestingly, the "new" playground design is not only more
concerned with safety, but also much more reflective of child development
and child play concerns.132 Additionally, new playgrounds are much easier
to maintain than the old playgrounds (because rubber-covered steel and
plastic is much more durable than wood or other materials), and require
less parental or governmental oversight of play. 13 3 Admittedly, relative

(quoting a school administrator who discussed litigation and playground renovation); see also
Michael D. Hinds, A New Effort to Make Child'sPlay Less Deadly, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 1989, at
Al (containing the same viewpoint but expressed by an industry representative).
130. It may be that I spend too much time with other Torts professors, but I always get a
"causation" objection at this point: "How do you know that it was litigation and safety concerns
that drove this change? Couldn't it have been rising incomes? Beautification? Or some other
factor?" I have a rather unsatisfying answer: Sure, in any individual case it could have been some
or all of these other factors. Nevertheless, each of those factors persisted since at least the 1920s,
and the traditional playground survived (and thrived). While I cannot prove individual causation,
the wholesale elimination of the traditional playground over such a short period of time can only
be explained in light of a shift in legal regimes and our national psychology of child safety.
131. One great example of this effect is the most recent NPPS survey of playground
equipment. See THE NAT'L PROGRAM FOR PLAYGROUND SAFETY, How SAFE ARE AMERICA'S
PLAYGROUNDS? A NATIONAL PROFILE OF CHILDCARE, SCHOOL, AND PARK PLAYGROUNDS, AN

UPDATE (2004) [hereinafter NPPS, How SAFE?]. Table 1 of the survey shows what equipment

appears in the surveyed playgrounds, and the percent change in prevalence from 2000 to 2004. Id.
at 4 tbl. 1. From once having been a classic element of the 'traditional' playground, seesaws are now
found in only thirteen percent of American playgrounds, down from twenty percent in 2000. See
id. Merry-go-rounds are similarly disappearing, falling from fourteen percent in 2000 to seven
percent in 2004. See id. Interestingly, looking at the playground accident data, one would expect
swings and slides to disappear before seesaws or merry-go-rounds, since they have caused many
more injuries. See CPSC, 2001 SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 121, at 13-14, 21-22.
132. For example, Play for All Guidelines has eight "planning criteria": play value,
programming potential, safety, play leadership, risk management, accessibility, integration, and
management issues. See PLAY FOR ALL GUIDELINES, supra note 9, at 64-65; Linda Cain Ruth,
Playground Design and Equipment, WHOLE BUILDING DESIGN GUIDE (2005),
http://www.wbdg.org/design/playground.php; cf ERIKSEN, supra note 14, at 57-92 (describing the
"playscape" as a replacement for the traditional playground); Jay Beckwith, No More Cookie Cutter
Parks, http://www.bpfp.org/PlaygroundDesign? NoMoreCookieCutter.htm (last visited May 1,
2005) (same).
133. Interestingly, the tort reform advocates, who generally take a more limited government,
libertarian approach, have ignored the governmental and parental supervision effects in their
vociferous defense of the traditional playground. Aside from the sheer cost of maintenance, pure
libertarians presumably would frown on government provision of play areas at all. Further, even
if governmental playgrounds are acceptable, why should the government supply extra risk to
children? Riskier playgrounds impose extra costs in terms of governmental or parental supervision.
I like to simply let my children wander free on the playground. I likely would feel quite differently
on a traditional playground. It seems like a true limited government approach would supply a
baseline of play and risk (and I would argue the new playgrounds do just that) and allow private
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judgments about playground design are subjective, but I find it hard to
believe that there are many who would choose the old prison yard-style
playgrounds over the new style. New playgrounds have more activities,
encourage group and imaginative play, and still have swings, slides, and
likely to include
climbing elements. 34 New playgrounds also are more
1 35
castles).
or
ships
pirate
(like
themes
and
play
water
Another sign that the new playground has hit a public nerve is the
incorporation of playground design elements into new (formerly nonplayground) public spaces. A great example is the new "Kid's Cove" at the
Knoxville Zoo, which includes slides and a water splashing area along
with the more typical petting zoo. Other examples include the Crown
Fountains at Chicago's Millennium Park, 136 and plans for a center field
berm playground at the University of South Carolina's new baseball
park. 137
The new playground design has spread to the private sector: A visit to
a McDonald's playground or a Chuck E. Cheese's certainly evinces the
dominance of the new design over the traditional.1 38 Backyard play
individuals to purchase any additional risk they want. If a tort reformer wants to pave her backyard
and install a seesaw, they still are available for sale. See, e.g., Outside Toys Pro Homepage,
http://www.outsidetoyspro.com/products/productDetail.asp?PRODID=
79&DEPid=0&ROOTdept=0 (last visited July 1, 2005) (selling traditional playground seesaws
for $344.00).
134. Furthermore, the increased interest in playgrounds has led to whole new approaches to
playground design. Consider the community-based design approach, which involves the community
in every aspect of the design process. See Leathers & Associates, About Us,
http://www.leathersassociates.com/introjframe.htm (last visited June 1, 2005). Another example
is the movement designing playgrounds for handicapped accessibility. See Boundless Playgrounds
Homepage, http://www.boundlessplaygrounds.org/aboutus/aboutus-unique.php (last visited June
1, 2005) ("Boundless Playgrounds enable all children-including those with physical,
developmental, cognitive and sensory disabilities-to experience independent, self-directed
play .... ).
135. Knoxville has two really fun water-based play areas, Concord Park and the Fountains at
World's Fair Park. A short walk from World's Fair Park is Fort Kid, a wooden playground built
with interlocking forts and castles connected by stairways, bridges and walkways. A mile or so
away, Tyson Park has a large pirate ship-themed playground.
136. See
Chicago's
Millennium
Park,
The
Crown
Fountain,
http://www.millenniumpark.org/crown.htm. For a favorable review of the fountains and
Millennium Park as a whole, see Witold Rybczynski, Chicago'sMagic Kingdom, SLATE, May 11,
2005, http://slate.msn.com/id/2118377/ (last visited June 1, 2005). Knoxville's World's Fair Park
also includes a substantial fountain play-area. See World's Fair Park, Attractions,
http://www.worldsfairpark.com/attractions.htmil (last visited June 1, 2005).
137. See John C. Drake, Design Details Emerge for USC Baseball Stadium, THE STATE
(Columbia, S.C.), May 27, 2005, at Al, available at http://www.thestate.com/mld/thestate/
news/speciaLpackages/growth /1 1749917.htm ("Plans for USC's $17.5 million baseball stadium
include grass berms for seating behind the outfield, a children's playground behind center field, and
a food court above the stands .... ").
138. See, e.g., Soft Contained Playgrounds, Playgrounds That Power Business,
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structures also invariably resemble the new playgrounds more than the
traditional.139
The true playground innovation is that playground manufacturers and
purchasers did not merely update the traditional playground. For example,
merely updating a dangerous product with a safer one would suggest
replacing seesaws on a one-to-one basis with "Spring Rocking
Equipment."' If this is what had happened in playgrounds across
America, I probably would agree with the tort reformers. 4 As the
Consumer Products Safety Commission (CPSC) has dryly understated,
"[p]reschool-age children enjoy the bouncing and rocking activities
presented by this equipment, but older children may not find it challenging
enough."' 42 Of course, this is generally not what happened. In response to
the safety revolution, designers and manufacturers reimagined
playgrounds from the ground up into a totally new format, featuring softer
surfaces, bridges, slides, and little forts.
Thus, after almost a century of ignored complaints about the
shortcomings of the traditional playground, the last thirty years have seen
a wholesale replacement of deficient playground equipment and dangerous
playground surfaces. 43
' Of course, critics remain. Interestingly, playground
designers have been among the critics of the new playground. Their
complaints fall into two categories. First, the new playground design

http://www.softplay.comEN/Markets/MarketDetails.asp?MarketTypelD =10 (last visited June 1,
2005) (showing multiple corporate restaurant playground designs). I actually consider the private
sector playgrounds to be conclusive proof that the new playgrounds are more fun than the
traditional ones. If McDonald's or Chuck E. Cheese's were swooping in to provide the seesaws and
carousels that the market so desperately desired, I might be convinced that the traditional
playground is truly missed (and possibly even superior).
139. See, e.g., Walmart Online Catalogue, Outdoor Play, http://www.walmart.comcatalog/
catalog.gsp?cat=14521&path=0%3A4171%3A14521 (last visited July 12, 2005). There also has
been tremendous worldwide growth in the playground equipment and design industries. See QIS
Capital Corporation, Independent Research: Diversaflow Corporation, Ltd.,
http://www.qiscapital.com/images/RRDVF.pdf (last visited July 12, 2005) (giving a favorable
report on playground manufacturing corporation, Diversaflow, and noting "[ifncreasing worldwide
demand for safe, sturdy play equipment").
140. "Spring Rocking Equipment" is the little horse or duck resting on top of a spring in
current playgrounds. The replacement of seesaws with spring rockers actually is exactly what the
CPSC's HandbookforPublic PlaygroundSafety suggests should be done. See CPSC, HANDBOOK,
supra note 10, at 23. For illustrations of spring rockers, including a horse and a dog, see id. at 27.
141. Knoxville's McCallie Park is a great example of an unimaginative response to safety
concerns. It has a bare metal slide and a metal swingset on a bed of pebbles. When we brought our
daughters to the playground my eldest asked: "Where's the rest?" For pictures of this sad little
playground, see Playground Photos, supra note 3.
142. CPSC, HANDBOOK, supra note 10, at 28.
143. According to the NPPS survey, eighty-two percent of playgrounds now have "suitable"
playground surfaces (meaning that "asphalt, concrete, dirt, and grass" surfaces have been replaced
with more shock absorbent materials). See NPPS, How SAFE?, supra note 131, at 12 tbl.5.
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criteria stifle creativity, and second, the new playgrounds are boring and
cookie-cutter. 44 Nevertheless, these criticisms generally compare the
current playgrounds with uniquely designed playgrounds, and are not an
145
endorsement of the "traditional" playground over the new playgrounds.
Even the critics admit that new "cookie-cutter" playgrounds
4 6 are an
approach.1
exercise-centered
traditional,
the
over
improvement
Similarly, some tort reform advocates have latched on to playground
design as anecdotal support for the negative effects of current tort law.
Philip K. Howard provides probably the most well known example:
All across America, playgrounds are being closed or stripped
of standard equipment. In 1997, Bristol, Connecticut,
removed all of the seesaws and merry-go-rounds from its
playgrounds ....

Some towns ...

have the resources to

replace playground equipment with new, safer alternatives,
including transparent tubes to crawl through and a one-person
seesaw that works on a spring. Can you wait? The new
equipment is so boring, according to Lauri Macmillan
Johnson, a professor of landscape architecture at the
University of Arizona, that children make up dangerous47
games, like crashing into the equipment with their bicycles. 1

144. See HENDRICKS, supra note 12, at 163-65; Johnson, supra note 14, at 2-3; Janny Scott,
When Child'sPlay is Too Simple; Experts Criticize Safety-Conscious Recreationas Boring, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 2000, at B9. Not to sound cynical, but at least some of this criticism can be
attributed to economic self-interest. Similar to architects' complaints about pre-fabricated housing,
I tend to be a little suspicious of designers' complaints about prefab playgrounds. Further, given
the mass replacement of traditional playgrounds, there has been a concomitant increase in interest
and business in playground design. A great example is my old elementary school, P.S. 321, which
replaced the sorry playground of my youth with one designed by a landscape architect. See Liz
Farrell Landscape Architecture, Awards & Competitions, http://www.newyorkarchitects.com/
content/profiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=profile&architect=2037&lang=e (last visited Oct. 22,2005).
145. See Beckwith, supra note 132. Futhermore, some of the criticisms have a decidedly
unrealistic and "designy" flavor. For example, playground designers continue to be infatuated with
the idea of the 'adventure playground.' Starting in the 1940s in Europe, adventure playgrounds
provided children with a small parcel of land, tools, and materials for building structures. See
ERIKSEN, supra note 14, at 20-24. Under the supervision of an adult, the children built whatever
they felt like. See id. Because of the level of supervision necessary (among other factors), the
adventure playground never took off in the United States. See id. at 25-26. Despite the concept's
lack of success in the United States, it still has a great following among playground designers. See
Brenda Fjeldsted, 'Standard' Versus 'Adventure' Playground, in INNOVATION IN PLAY
ENviRONMENTs 34, 34-44 (Paul F. Wilkinson ed., 1980) (describing the strengths of the adventure
playground model); ROUARD & SIMON, supra note 117, at 130-32 (same). Admittedly, the
adventure playground does sound like fun, but deeply impractical. The requirement of permanent,
professional adult supervision alone makes the idea untenable in the United States.
146. See BRETT ET AL., supra note 13, at 9-15 (comparing newer "creative playgrounds"
favorably to "traditional playgrounds").
147.byHOWARD,
supra note Repository,
19, at 3-4. 2006
Howard has been cited by the U.S. House of 33
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Howard's critique raises three interesting points. First, the initial
portion is a great example of considering the costs without the attendant
benefits. Howard begins with the costs-traditional playgrounds are being
"closed" or "stripped"-before he ever turns to the benefits of the
replacement playgrounds. 4 '
Second, once Howard does turn his attention to the potential benefits,
he notes that new playground equipment is expensive and "boring."149 As
support for this position, he uses "Lauri Macmillan Johnson, a professor
of landscape architecture at the University of Arizona" and an anecdote
about children crashing their bikes into the new, boring playground
equipment. I was somewhat flummoxed by this criticism of the new
playgrounds, and I seriously doubted the existence of an epidemic of
children crashing their bikes into playground equipment.
So, I e-mailed Professor Johnson and asked her two questions. First,
did empirical evidence exist supporting a bike-crashing trend? The answer,
unsurprisingly, was no.15 Second, I asked her if, despite her misgivings

Representatives, see H.R. REP.No. 108-682, at 9-10 (2004) (citing Howard in support of the
contention that "[tihe lawsuit culture is even changing the traditional American landscape:
playgrounds are increasingly removing seesaws for fear of liability"), and echoed by Newsweek,
see Stuart Taylor Jr. & Evan Thomas, Civil Wars, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 15, 2004, at 42 ("Playgrounds
all over the country have been stripped of monkey bars, jungle gyms, high slides and swings,
seesaws and other old-fashioned equipment once popularized by President John F. Kennedy's
physical-fitness campaign. The reason: thousands of lawsuits by people who hurt themselves at
playgrounds.").
148. See HOWARD, supra note 19, at 3-4. For a similar cost-first approach, see RAUCH, supra
note 129, at 106-07, which argued that "playgrounds have been stripped of their equipment." As
for Bristol, Connecticut, it is hard to determine from a distance whether the town has left all of its
playgrounds empty of equipment since 1997, but the Bristol Rotary Club website has a lengthy
story about (and cool photos of) a fully handicapped-accessible "boundless" playground built in
Bristol in 1999.
See Bristol Rotary Club,
Dewitt Page Park,
http://www.bristolrotaryct.org/Playground/Playground.htm (last visited May 1, 2005); Bristol
Rotary Club, Groundbreaking, http://www.bristolrotaryct.org/Playground/Groundbreaking.htm (last
visited May 1, 2005); Boundless Playgrounds, Bristol, Connecticut,
http://www.boundlessplaygrounds.org/findplaygrounds/CT/bristol.php (last visited May 1,2005).
There is another exceptional "boundless" playground in Chattanooga, Tennessee, at the Siskin
School.
See Siskin Childrens'
Institute,
Playground Education,
http://www.siskin.org/playgroundedu/home.asp (last visited May 1, 2005),
149. See HoWARD, supra note 19, at 3-4.
150. Her e-mail states: "I will be honest I have not seen Howard's text on the bike-crashing
story. I never meant to portray this as a trend." Actually, the real story is even more interesting than
a trend. Professor Johnson consulted on a lawsuit involving bike-crashing kids:
I was however, involved with a litigation where designers were being sued in a
playground injury case involving a kid who broke his neck by crashing his bike
into the play equipment. Attorneys interviewed me as a potential expert witness
but ultimately did not use me. As I understand the story of this one isolated case,
the kids had invented a game where they rode their bikes around the equipment
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with the cookie-cutter nature of current playgrounds, she preferred them
to the52 "prison yard" playgrounds of yore? 5 ' The answer was a qualified
yes.

1

Professor Johnson, among other playground designers, raises important
questions about the interaction between risk, safety, and keeping
children's interest. 531 think there certainly is something to the criticism
that insulating children from all risks may be poor preparation for life, and
may force 5 4them to seek risks in more dangerous and uncontrollable
situations.1

Nevertheless, the realities of the new playground design suggest that
the risk/safety calculus may be occurring. The CPSC's 1975 survey
showed that slides, climbing equipment like monkey-bars, and swings

and at a certain point they purposely crashed into the structure. I could not fault
the designer in this case as the playground was designed to be safe and as a result
lacked challenging experiences.
E-mail from Lauri Macmillan Johnson, Professor of Landscape Architecture, University of Arizona,
to Benjamin H. Barton, Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law (on
file with author).
151. The "prison yard" reference is Johnson's own description of the traditional playground.
See Johnson, supra note 14, at 1.
152. In her e-mail, Professor Johnson states the following:
However as far as your question goes I think some of these new playgrounds are
better than the old playgrounds. Here's what to look for when evaluating: Is the
equipment a system with linked components? How many activities can be
performed on the piece? Is there more than one way up and more than one way
down? Are there different levels of risk incorporated into the piece? Are there
deliberate ways the child can manipulate the piece?
E-mail from Lauri Macmillan Johnson, Professor ofLandscape Architecture, University of Arizona,
to Benjamin H. Barton, Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law (on
file with author).
153. See Johnson, supra note 14, at 1-3, 6; Scott, supra note 144, at B9.
154. In the torts literature this is frequently referred to as the "second best" problem of
eliminating products. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Extending the Bounds of Strict Products
Liability:Implicationsof the Theory of the Second Best, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1036, 1037-38 (1980)
(arguing that if product liability eliminates or over-prices certain products, consumers may shift to
even riskier substitutes). For example, if tort liability chases off all of the ladder manufacturers,
people will cut their hedges or clean their gutters teetering on kitchen chairs, or other products more
dangerous than ladders. Similarly, when children are denied simple dangers, they may
overcompensate by climbing the tall structures or playing in dumpsters. See Johnson, supra note
14, at 2-3. The fact that falls from playground equipment are the number one cause of injury, lends
credence to this theory. See CPSC, 2001 SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 121, at iii ("Overall threefourths (79 percent) of the injuries that occurred on public equipment involved falls.").
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were much more dangerous than seesaws or carousels, 155 probably because
falls from heights are the number one playground injury danger.'56
Nevertheless, slides, swings, and climbers are still found on most
playgrounds, while seesaws and carousels are rapidly heading toward
extinction. 57As the NPPS noted, "the most common pieces of equipment
found on playgrounds involve minimum heights of six feet."158 Playground
safety advocates have focused on playground surfacing, rather than
eliminating all height from playgrounds) 59 This is a sign that even the
playground safety proponents balance the need for entertaining
playgrounds with safety concems.' 6°
Third, Howard and others directly link the playground revolution to
lawsuits,' 6' but the loss of the seesaw hardly can be chalked up to lawsuits.
A June 2005 Westlaw "all courts" search of "negligence or 'product
liability' /p seesaw" drew only twenty-five cases nationally.'62 Given the
paucity of seesaw cases, it seems much more likely that the CPSC's nonmandatory Handbook on Playground Safety has had a much greater
influence on the playground revolution than lawsuits. Most notably,
changes in societal mores and psychology have driven most of the
reforms. People, especially parents, are simply much more safety
conscious these days.'63

155. See CPSC, 1975 HAZARD ANALYSIS, supra note 121, at 13 fig.3, 14-16.
156. This was true in 1975 and 2001. See id. at 3 ("Three-fourths of all the injuries were falls
[from slides or climbing apparatus] to the ground or onto other equipment."); CPSC, 2001 SPECIAL
STUDY, supra note 121, at iii ("Overall about three-fourths (79 percent) of the injuries that occurred
on public equipment involved falls.").
157. See NPPS, How SAFE?, supra note 131, at 4 tbl. 1.
158. See id. at 4.
159. See CPSC, 2001 SPEcIALSTUDY, supra note 121, at 25; NPPS, How SAFE?, supra note
131, at 4.
160. I also wonder why tort reform advocates-who are presumably in favor of less
government rather than more-want the government to supply risk at all. Howard and others want
the government to provide riskier playgrounds. Why? Shouldn't a limited government supply a
relatively low baseline of risk to children with private individuals supplementing as they see fit?
If a tort reformer wants to put a seesaw in his backyard they are still available for purchase (try a
Google search for "backyard seesaw"). Riskier playgrounds are actually an imposition of duties on
private parties and the government. Many of our friends like to trail their children throughout a
playground to ensure safety. I prefer to lay back most of the time, and the new safer playgrounds
allow me that freedom. Likewise, teachers responsible for children during recess likely react
differently to the new and traditional playgrounds. The main point is that as playgrounds grow
riskier they involve increased costs in parental and governmental oversight.
161. See HOWARD, supra note 19, at 3-6.

162. A Westlaw search of the "allcases" database on June 1, 2005, using the search terms
"'product liability' negligence/p seesaw," resulted in twenty-five cases ranging in date from 1994
to 1902.
163. Notably, Philip Howard actually probably agrees with me about this point. See Philip
Howard, Comments at the 2002 Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit (June 7,2002), available
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Other children's products have followed a similar journey. I chose
playground design as my case study, but a review of the design and
manufacture of strollers, cribs, and high chairs would show that safety
concerns have become paramount in the last thirty years. I would likewise
argue that each of these products has been improved above and beyond
safety improvements. Consider, for example, high chairs. I grew up eating
in a wooden high chair with swinging parts and no safety belt. New high
chairs not only are safer (made of rounded and frequently padded plastic,
and including safety belts and bars to prevent slippage), but they also
feature wheels for easy movement, angle adjustments for sleeping, height
adjustments, and removable platters for easy cleaning, among other more
exotic features."6 Similar seismic
shifts in design have occurred in
65
strollers, car seats, and cribs.
IV. CONCLUSION

Overall, in areas of significant liability concerns, like products for
children, there have been substantial redesigns and safety improvements.
Substantive design improvements unrelated to safety have tagged along,
however, making these products better overall. The success of these
products perfectly fits my entrepreneurial model: Innovative companies
have reacted to the shift in product liability by rethinking and redesigning
their products from the ground up. I conclude, therefore, that product
liability has not cramped innovation. To the contrary, it has enhanced
innovation in multiple product sectors, as safety enhancements have led
to product enhancements.
Admittedly, product liability probably has had little effect on other
areas of the economy, since few products required the kind of safety
redesign that would trigger my innovation effect. Nevertheless, the
unaffected areas certainly have not experienced a suppression of
innovation.
I also should note that I am not suggesting that the tort reform
advocates are wrong across the board, or that the tort system does not need
reforming. I have great sympathy for the claim that the shift in American

in 221 F.R.D. 38 (2002) ("I have not been able to find one case where someone sued and won over
a seesaw, and yet seesaws are disappearing throughout America because people got the idea that
who is going to protect you if one child gets off too soon and the other falls off.").
164. See, e.g., Amazon.com, Cappuccino Prima Pappa "R" High Chair,
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tgldetai-/BO0070QJBW/104-4713768-9179927?v=glance
(last visited July 1, 2005).
165. When I explained to my Mom that our baby car seats snapped out of a base in the car and
into a folding, modular stroller, I thought she might lose her mind. When she emptied her attic and
I saw the equipment I was raised on, I thought I might lose mine.
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psychology has had insalubrious effects."6 I am convinced, however, that
these negative effects do not include a crushing of innovation and,
therefore, should not dominate the calculus when considering tort reform.

166. If you want an example of these effects, consider my behavior at home since I began
research in this topic. My wife recently acquired a used swingset from neighbors. I immediately
pronounced it "a major safety hazard" and began quoting CPSC statistics on home playground
equipment accidents. Yes, I am indeed a non-stop party as a husband and Dad. A more pathetic
example is a recent warning from the CPSC that bike helmets are not to be worn on playgrounds
because of the strangulation hazard. See Press Release, CPSC, After Recent Death, CPSC Warns
Against Wearing Bike Helmets on Playgrounds, (Feb. 22, 1999), available at
http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prereliprhtm199/99065.html. If safety concerns now dictate parents
sending children out to play in helmets we have certainly gone too far.
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